In this work we describe successor heads: attention heads that increment tokens with a natural ordering, such as numbers, months, and days. For example, successor heads increment 'Monday' into 'Tuesday'. We explain the successor head behavior with an approach rooted in mechanistic interpretability, the field that aims to explain how models complete tasks in human-understandable terms. Existing research in this area has struggled to find recurring, mechanistically interpretable large language model (LLM) components beyond small toy models. Further, existing results have led to very little insight to explain the internals of the larger models that are used in practice. In this paper, we analyze the behavior of successor heads in LLMs and find that they implement abstract representations that are common to different architectures. Successor heads form in LLMs with as few as 31 million parameters, and at least as many as 12 billion parameters, such as GPT-2, Pythia, and Llama-2. We find a set of 'mod 10' features that underlie how successor heads increment in LLMs across different architectures and sizes. We perform vector arithmetic with these features to edit head behavior and provide insights into numeric representations within LLMs. Additionally, we study the behavior of successor heads on natural language data, where we find that successor heads are important for achieving a low loss on examples involving succession, and also identify interpretable polysemanticity in a Pythia successor head.

Are foundation models secure against malicious actors? In this work, we focus on the image input to a vision-language model (VLM). We discover image hijacks, adversarial images that control the behaviour of VLMs at inference time, and introduce the general Behaviour Matching algorithm for training image hijacks. From this, we derive the Prompt Matching method, allowing us to train hijacks matching the behaviour of an arbitrary user-defined text prompt (e.g. ’the Eiffel Tower is now located in Rome’) using a generic, off-the-shelf dataset unrelated to our choice of prompt. We use Behaviour matching to craft hijacks for four types of attack: forcing VLMs to generate outputs of the adversary’s choice, leak information from their context window, override their safety training, and believe false statements. We study these attacks against LLaVA, a state-of-the-art VLM based on CLIP and LLaMA-2, and find that all attack types achieve a success rate of over 80%. Moreover, our attacks are automated and require only small image perturbations.

We propose using mechanistic interpretability -- techniques for reverse engineering model weights into human-interpretable algorithms -- to derive and compactly prove formal guarantees on model performance. We prototype this approach by formally proving accuracy lower bounds for a small transformer trained on Max-of-$K$, validating proof transferability across 151 random seeds and four values of $K$. We create 102 different computer-assisted proof strategies and assess their length and tightness of bound on each of our models. Using quantitative metrics, we find that shorter proofs seem to require and provide more mechanistic understanding. Moreover, we find that more faithful mechanistic understanding leads to tighter performance bounds. We confirm these connections by qualitatively examining a subset of our proofs. Finally, we identify compounding structureless errors as a key challenge for using mechanistic interpretability to generate compact proofs on model performance.