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Simon Beyzerov

dblp:336/5571 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 100%
Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper
Query processing and optimization · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › secure multiparty computation
secure two-party computation
0.912025
FABLE: Batched Evaluation on Confidential Lookup Tables in 2PC · USENIX Security Symposium 2025
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
function secret sharing
0.712023
Private Access Control for Function Secret Sharing · SP 2023
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems
zero-knowledge proofs
0.212023
Private Access Control for Function Secret Sharing · SP 2023

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

zero-knowledge proofs · 0.7secret sharing · 0.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 FABLE: Batched Evaluation on Confidential Lookup Tables in 2PC
Zhengyuan Su, Qi Pang, Simon Beyzerov, Wenting Zheng
USENIX Security Symposium3
2023 Private Access Control for Function Secret Sharing
abstract
Function Secret Sharing (FSS; Eurocrypt 2015) allows a dealer to share a function f with two or more evaluators. Given secret shares of a function f, the evaluators can locally compute secret shares of f (x) for any input x, without learning information about f in the process.In this paper, we initiate the study of access control for FSS. Given the shares of f, the evaluators can ensure that the dealer is authorized to share the provided function. For a function family $\mathcal{F}$ and an access control list defined over the family, the evaluators receiving the shares of $f \in \mathcal{F}$ can efficiently check that the dealer knows the access key for f.This model enables new applications of FSS, such as: (1) anonymous authentication in a multi-party setting, (2) access control in private databases, and (3) authentication and spam prevention in anonymous communication systems.Our definitions and constructions abstract and improve the concrete efficiency of several recent systems that implement ad-hoc mechanisms for access control over FSS. The main building block behind our efficiency improvement is a discrete-logarithm zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge over secret-shared elements, which may be of independent interest.We evaluate our constructions and show a 50–70× reduction in computational overhead compared to existing access control techniques used in anonymous communication. In other applications, such as private databases, the processing cost of introducing access control is only 1.5–3×, when amortized over databases with 500,000 or more items.
Sacha Servan-Schreiber, Simon Beyzerov, Eli Yablon, Hyojae Park
SP2