In this paper, we investigate a model relevant to semantics-aware goal-oriented communications, and propose a new metric that incorporates the utilization of information in addition to its timelines. We consider the transmission of observations from an external process to a battery-powered receiver through status updates. These updates inform the receiver about the process status and enable actuation if sufficient energy is available. We focus on a wireless power transfer (WPT) model, where the receiver receives energy from a dedicated power transmitter.We analyze the Age of Information (AoI) and propose a new metric, theAge of Actuation (AoA), which is relevant when the receiver utilizes the status updates to perform actions in a timely manner. We provide analytical characterizations of the average AoA and the violation probability of the AoA, demonstrating that AoA generalizes AoI. Moreover, we introduce and analytically characterize the Probability ofMissing Actuation (PoMA); this metric becomes relevant also toquantify the incurred cost of a missed action. We formulate unconstrained and constrained optimization problems for all the metrics and present numerical evaluations of our analytical results. This proposed set of metrics goes beyond the traditional timeliness metrics since the synergy of different flows is now considered.

In this paper, we use a linear programming (LP) optimization approach to evaluate the equivocation when coding over a wiretap channel model where the main channel is noiseless and the eavesdropper’s channel is a binary symmetric channel (BSC). Using this technique, we present a numerically-derived upper bound for the achievable secrecy rate in the finite blocklength regime that is tighter than traditional infinite blocklength bounds. We also propose a secrecy coding technique that outperforms random binning codes. When there is one overhead bit, this coding technique is optimum and achieves the newly derived bound. For cases with additional bits of overhead, our coding scheme can achieve equivocation rates close to the new bound. Furthermore, we explore the patterns of the generator matrix and the parity-check matrix for linear codes and we present binning techniques for both linear and nonlinear codes using two different approaches: recursive and non-recursive. To our knowledge, this is the first optimization solution for secrecy coding obtained through linear programming. Our new bounds and codes mark a significant breakthrough towards understanding fundamental limits of performance (and how to achieve them in some instances) for the binary symmetric wiretap channel with real finite blocklength coding constructions. Our techniques are especially useful for codes of small to medium blocklength, such as those that may be required by applications with small payloads, such as the Internet of Things.

In this paper, we extend the metric of Age of Actuation (AoA), and we propose the Age of Actuated Information (AoAI) within a discrete-time system that integrates data caching and energy harvesting (EH). AoA evaluates the timeliness of actions irrespective of the age of the information, while AoAI considers the freshness of the utilized data packet. We analytically characterize the performance of AoA and AoAI for the system at hand. Our findings show that while AoAI consistently decreases with increased data and energy packet arrival rates, AoA shows a counter-intuitive behavior, with a potential increase under limited data or energy availability. These metrics go towards the semantics of information and goal-oriented communications since they consider the timeliness of the utilized information to perform an action.

Debates over paid peering and usage fees have expanded from the United States to Europe and South Korea. A key part of the debate concerns whether the ISP sets the peering price based on costs incurred by the large video service providers or if it instead reflects the ISP's market power and monopolistic control over end-users. This question gains significance in light of the recent Federal Communications Commission (FCC) decision to reconsider the reinstatement of net neutrality rules. In this paper, we determine the peering price that maximizes an ISP's profit using a two-sided market model in which a profit-maximizing ISP determines broadband prices and the peering price, and in which content providers determine their service prices based on the peering price. Our findings reveal that ISPs, when driven by profit-maximization motives, tend to set a peering fee that is sub-stantially above cost, often reaching the upper limit of what content providers are willing to pay. Additionally, our model sheds light on the influence of various factors, such as the number of interconnection points and the level of traffic localization, on the determination of an ISP's proflt-maximizing peering price.

Disagreements over peering fees have risen to the level of potential government regulation. ISPs assert that content providers should pay them based on the volume of downstream traffic. Transit providers and content providers assert that consumers have already paid ISPs to transmit the content they request and that peering agreements should be settlement-free. Our goal is to determine the fair payment between an ISP and an interconnecting network. We consider fair cost sharing between two Tier-1 ISPs, and derive the peering fee that equalizes their net backbone transportation costs. We then consider fair cost sharing between an ISP and a transit provider. We derive the peering fee that equalizes their net backbone transportation costs, and illustrate how it depends on the traffic ratio and the amount of localization of that content. Finally, we consider the fair peering fee between an ISP and a content provider. We derive the peering fee that results in the same net cost to the ISP, and illustrate how the peering fee depends on the number of interconnection points and the amount of localization of that content. We dispense with the ISP argument that it should be paid regardless of the amount of localization of content.

Large Internet Service Providers (ISPs) often require that peers meet certain requirements to be eligible for free-settlement peering. The conventional wisdom is that these requirements are related to the perception of roughly equal value from the peering arrangement, but the academic literature has not yet established such a relationship. The focus of this paper is to relate the settlement-free peering requirements between two large ISPs and understand the degree to which the settlement-free peering requirements between them should apply to the peering between large ISPs and content providers. We analyze settlement-free peering requirements about the number and location of interconnection points (IXPs). Large ISPs often require interconnection at a minimum of 6 to 8 interconnection points. We find that the ISP's traffic-sensitive cost is decreasing and convex with the number of interconnection points. We also observe that there may be little value in requiring interconnection at more than 8 IXPs. We then analyze the interconnection between a large content provider and an ISP. We show that it is rational for an ISP to agree to settlement-free peering if the content provider agrees to interconnect at a specified minimum number of interconnection points and to deliver a specified minimum proportion of traffic locally.

Disagreements between Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and content providers over peering fees have risen to the level of potential government regulation. ISPs assert that content providers should pay peering fees based on the volume of downstream traffic. Content providers assert that consumers pay ISPs to transmit the content they request, and thus peering agreements should be settlement-free. We determine the fair peering fee between an ISP and a transit provider or content provider. We first consider cost sharing between an ISP and a transit provider. We derive the peering fee that equalizes their net backbone transportation costs. We illustrate how the peering fee depends on the traffic ratio and the amount of localization of that content. We then derive the peering fee between an ISP and a content provider that results in the same net cost to the ISP, and illustrate how the peering fee depends on the number of interconnection points and the amount of localization. We use these results to dispense with the ISP argument that they should be paid regardless of the amount of localization of content.

Peering between two networks may be either settlement-free or paid. In order to qualify for settlement-free peering, large Internet Service Providers (ISPs) require that peers meet certain requirements. However, the academic literature has not yet shown the relationship between these settlement-free peering requirements and the value to each interconnecting network. We develop two models to analyze the value to each network from the most common and important requirements in the United States. Large ISPs in the U.S. often require potential settlement-free peers to interconnect at a minimum of 6–8 locations. We find that there is a substantial benefit from this requirement to the ISP, but little incremental benefit from a larger number of interconnection points. Large ISPs often require that the ratio of incoming traffic to outgoing traffic remain below approximately 2:1. In the case of two interconnecting ISPs, we find that this requirement ensures a roughly equal exchange of value. We also show that it is rational for an ISP to agree to settlement-free peering if the content provider agrees to interconnect at a specified minimum number of interconnection points and to deliver a specified minimum proportion of traffic locally, but a limit on the traffic ratio is irrational.

Peering between two networks may be either settlement-free or paid. In order to qualify for settlement-free peering, large Internet Service Providers (ISPs) require that peers meet certain requirements. It is widely perceived that these requirements represent the conditions under which the two peering networks perceive a roughly equal exchange of value. However, the academic literature has not yet shown the relationship between these settlement-free peering requirements and the value to each interconnecting network. We analyze the value to each network from the most common and important requirements. Large ISPs often require potential settlement-free peers to interconnect at a minimum of 6–8 locations from a predetermined list. We find that there is a substantial benefit from this requirement to the ISP, but little incremental benefit from a larger number of interconnection points. Large ISPs often require that the ratio of incoming traffic to outgoing traffic remain below approximately 2:1. We find that this requirement ensures a roughly equal exchange of value.