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Nathan Wozny

dblp:34/5467 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2004
—ORCID · unresolved

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1Theory of computation · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
market design		 0.012004
Experimental study of market reputation mechanisms · EC 2004
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › dynamic mechanism design
reputation mechanism		 0.012004
Experimental study of market reputation mechanisms · EC 2004

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

laboratory experiment · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2004 Experimental study of market reputation mechanisms
abstract
We experimentally compare low-information, high-information and self-reporting reputation mechanisms. The results indicate players strategically reacted to the reputation mechanisms, with higher information mechanisms increasing market efficiency.
Kay-Yut Chen, Tad Hogg, Nathan Wozny
 EC3