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Rajashree Agrawal

dblp:346/4882 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
0as first author
4since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0001-7617-9180ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 4 · 4 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
3 papers
Trustworthy machine learning · 64% Vision and language · 17% Language models and text generation · 15%
Network and information security
2 papers
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Program verification · 100%

Topics — the 10 heaviest of 11, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack
1.622025
Failures to Find Transferable Image Jailbreaks Between Vision-Language Models · ICLR 2025
Many-shot Jailbreaking · NeurIPS 2024
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness
0.912025
Failures to Find Transferable Image Jailbreaks Between Vision-Language Models · ICLR 2025
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness › adversarial attack
transfer attack
0.912025
Failures to Find Transferable Image Jailbreaks Between Vision-Language Models · ICLR 2025
Computer vision › Vision and language
vision-language model
0.912025
Failures to Find Transferable Image Jailbreaks Between Vision-Language Models · ICLR 2025
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
interpretability
0.812024
Compact Proofs of Model Performance via Mechanistic Interpretability · NeurIPS 2024
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
large language model safety
0.812024
Many-shot Jailbreaking · NeurIPS 2024
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › interpretability
mechanistic interpretability
0.812024
Compact Proofs of Model Performance via Mechanistic Interpretability · NeurIPS 2024
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
jailbreak attack
0.812024
Many-shot Jailbreaking · NeurIPS 2024
Machine learning › Deep learning architectures and training
transformer
0.212024
Compact Proofs of Model Performance via Mechanistic Interpretability · NeurIPS 2024
Security and privacy of machine learning
prompt injection
0.212024
Many-shot Jailbreaking · NeurIPS 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

gradient-based optimization · 1.7ensemble attack · 1.7mechanistic interpretability · 1.5long-context prompting · 1.5in-context learning · 1.5computer-assisted proof · 1.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Failures to Find Transferable Image Jailbreaks Between Vision-Language Models
abstract
The integration of new modalities into frontier AI systems offers exciting capabilities, but also increases the possibility such systems can be adversarially manipulated in undesirable ways. In this work, we focus on a popular class of vision-language models (VLMs) that generate text outputs conditioned on visual and textual inputs. We conducted a large-scale empirical study to assess the transferability of gradient-based universal image "jailbreaks" using a diverse set of over 40 open-parameter VLMs, including 18 new VLMs that we publicly release. Overall, we find that transferable gradient-based image jailbreaks are extremely difficult to obtain. When an image jailbreak is optimized against a single VLM or against an ensemble of VLMs, the jailbreak successfully jailbreaks the attacked VLM(s), but exhibits little-to-no transfer to any other VLMs; transfer is not affected by whether the attacked and target VLMs possess matching vision backbones or language models, whether the language model underwent instruction-following and/or safety-alignment training, or many other factors. Only two settings display partially successful transfer: between identically-pretrained and identically-initialized VLMs with slightly different VLM training data, and between different training checkpoints of a single VLM. Leveraging these results, we then demonstrate that transfer can be significantly improved against a specific target VLM by attacking larger ensembles of "highly-similar" VLMs. These results stand in stark contrast to existing evidence of universal and transferable text jailbreaks against language models and transferable adversarial attacks against image classifiers, suggesting that VLMs may be more robust to gradient-based transfer attacks.
Rylan Schaeffer, Dan Valentine, Luke Bailey, James Chua, Cristóbal Eyzaguirre, Zane Durante, Joe Benton, Brando Miranda, Henry Sleight, Tony T. Wang 0001, Rajashree Agrawal, Mrinank Sharma, Scott Emmons, Oluwasanmi Koyejo, Ethan Perez
ICLR12
2024 Many-shot Jailbreaking
abstract
We investigate a family of simple long-context attacks on large language models: prompting with hundreds of demonstrations of undesirable behavior. This attack is newly feasible with the larger context windows recently deployed by language model providers like Google DeepMind, OpenAI and Anthropic. We find that in diverse, realistic circumstances, the effectiveness of this attack follows a power law, up to hundreds of shots. We demonstrate the success of this attack on the most widely used state-of-the-art closed-weight models, and across various tasks. Our results suggest very long contexts present a rich new attack surface for LLMs.
Cem Anil, Esin Durmus, Nina Panickssery, Mrinank Sharma, Joe Benton, Sandipan Kundu, Joshua Batson, Meg Tong, Jesse Mu, Daniel Ford, Francesco Mosconi, Rajashree Agrawal, Rylan Schaeffer, Naomi Bashkansky, Samuel Svenningsen, Mike Lambert, Ansh Radhakrishnan, Carson Denison, Evan Hubinger, Yuntao Bai, Trenton Bricken, Timothy Maxwell, Nicholas Schiefer, James Sully, Alex Tamkin, Tamera Lanham, Karina Nguyen, Tomek Korbak, Jared Kaplan, Deep Ganguli, Samuel R. Bowman, Ethan Perez, Roger B. Grosse, David Duvenaud
NeurIPS12
2024 Compact Proofs of Model Performance via Mechanistic Interpretability
abstract
We propose using mechanistic interpretability -- techniques for reverse engineering model weights into human-interpretable algorithms -- to derive and compactly prove formal guarantees on model performance. We prototype this approach by formally proving accuracy lower bounds for a small transformer trained on Max-of-$K$, validating proof transferability across 151 random seeds and four values of $K$. We create 102 different computer-assisted proof strategies and assess their length and tightness of bound on each of our models. Using quantitative metrics, we find that shorter proofs seem to require and provide more mechanistic understanding. Moreover, we find that more faithful mechanistic understanding leads to tighter performance bounds. We confirm these connections by qualitatively examining a subset of our proofs. Finally, we identify compounding structureless errors as a key challenge for using mechanistic interpretability to generate compact proofs on model performance.
Jason Gross, Rajashree Agrawal, Thomas Kwa, Euan Ong, Chun Hei Yip, Alex Gibson, Soufiane Noubir, Lawrence Chan
NeurIPS2
2024 Towards a Scalable Proof Engine: A Performant Prototype Rewriting Primitive for Coq
abstract
Abstract We address the challenges of scaling verification efforts to match the increasing complexity and size of systems. We propose a research agenda aimed at building a performant proof engine by studying the asymptotic performance of proof engines and redesigning their building blocks. As a case study, we explore equational rewriting and introduce a novel prototype proof engine building block for rewriting in Coq, utilizing proof by reflection for enhanced performance. Our prototype implementation can significantly improve the development of verified compilers, as demonstrated in a case study with the Fiat Cryptography toolchain. The resulting extracted command-line compiler is about 1000 $$\times $$ × faster while featuring simpler compiler-specific proofs. This work lays some foundation for scaling verification efforts and contributes to the broader goal of developing a proof engine with good asymptotic performance, ultimately aimed at enabling the verification of larger and more complex systems.
Jason Gross, Andres Erbsen, Jade Philipoom, Rajashree Agrawal, Adam Chlipala
J. Autom. Reason.4