All critical systems must evolve to meet the needs of a growing and diversifying user base. But supporting that evolution is challenging at increasing scale: Maintainers must find a way to ensure that each change does only what is intended, and will not inadvertently change behavior for existing users. This paper presents how we addressed this challenge for the Amazon Web Services (AWS) authorization engine, invoked 1 billion times per second, by using formal verification. Over a period of four years, we built a new authorization engine, one that behaves functionally the same as its predecessor, using the verification-aware programming language Dafny. We can now confidently deploy enhancements and optimizations while maintaining the highest assurance of both correctness and backward compatibility. We deployed the new engine in 2024 without incident and customers immediately enjoyed a threefold performance improvement. The methodology we followed to build this new engine was not an off-the-shelf application of an existing verification tool, and this paper presents several key insights: 1) Rather than prove correct the existing engine, written in Java, we found it more effective to write a new engine in Dafny, a language built for verification from the ground up, and then compile the result to Java. 2) To ensure performance, debuggability, and to gain trust from stakeholders, we needed to generate readable, idiomatic Java code, essentially a transliteration of the source Dafny. 3) To ensure that the specification matches the system's actual behavior, we performed extensive differential and shadow testing throughout the development process, ultimately comparing against 1015production samples prior to deployment. Our approach demonstrates how formal verification can be effectively applied to evolve critical legacy software at scale.

We consider the formulation of a symbolic execution (SE) procedure for functional programs that interact with effectful, opaque libraries. Our procedure allows specifications of libraries and abstract data type (ADT) methods that are expressed in Linear Temporal Logic over Finite Traces (LTL f ), interpreting them as symbolic finite automata (SFAs) to enable intelligent specification-guided path exploration in this setting. We apply our technique to facilitate the falsification of complex data structure safety properties in terms of effectful operations made by ADT methods on underlying opaque representation type(s). Specifications naturally characterize admissible traces of temporally-ordered events that ADT methods (and the library methods they depend upon) are allowed to perform. We show how to use these specifications to construct feasible symbolic input states for the corresponding methods, as well as how to encode safety properties in terms of this formalism. More importantly, we incorporate the notion of symbolic derivatives , a mechanism that allows the SE procedure to intelligently underapproximate the set of precondition states it needs to explore, based on the automata structures latent in the provided specifications and the safety property that is to be falsified. Intuitively, derivatives enable symbolic execution to exploit temporal constraints defined by trace-based specifications to quickly prune unproductive paths and discover feasible error states. Experimental results on a wide-range of challenging ADT implementations demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach.

Ensuring the reliability of smart contracts is of vital importance due to the wide adoption of smart contract programs in decentralized financial applications. However, statically checking many rich properties of smart contract programs can be challenging. On the other hand, dynamic validation approaches have shown promise for widespread adoption in practice. Nevertheless, as part of the programming environment for smart contracts, existing dynamic validation approaches have not provided programmers with a notion to clearly articulate the interface between components, especially for addresses representing opaque contract instances. We argue that the “design-by-contract” approach should complement the development of smart contract programs. Unfortunately, there is limited linguistic support for it in existing smart contract languages. In this paper, we design a Solidity language extension, ConSol, that supports behavioral contracts. ConSol provides programmers with a modular specification and monitoring system for both functional and latent address behaviors. The key capability of ConSol is to attach specifications to first-class addresses and monitor violations when invoking these addresses. We evaluate ConSol using 20 real-world cases, demonstrating its effectiveness in expressing critical conditions and preventing attacks. Additionally, we assess ConSol’s efficiency and compare gas consumption with programs fixed with manually inserted assertions, showing that our approach introduces only marginal gas overhead. By separating specifications and implementations using behavioral contracts, ConSol assists programmers in writing more robust and readable smart contracts.

Several modern programming systems, including GHC Haskell, Agda, Idris, and Hazel, support typed holes . Assigning static and, to varying degree, dynamic meaning to programs with holes allows program editors and other tools to offer meaningful feedback and assistance throughout editing, i.e. in a live manner. Prior work, however, has considered only holes appearing in expressions and types. This paper considers, from type theoretic and logical first principles, the problem of typed pattern holes. We confront two main difficulties, (1) statically reasoning about exhaustiveness and irredundancy when patterns are not fully known, and (2) live evaluation of expressions containing both pattern and expression holes. In both cases, this requires reasoning conservatively about all possible hole fillings. We develop a typed lambda calculus, Peanut, where reasoning about exhaustiveness and redundancy is mapped to the problem of deriving first order entailments. We equip Peanut with an operational semantics in the style of Hazelnut Live that allows us to evaluate around holes in both expressions and patterns. We mechanize the metatheory of Peanut in Agda and formalize a procedure capable of deciding the necessary entailments. Finally, we scale up and implement these mechanisms within Hazel, a programming environment for a dialect of Elm that automatically inserts holes during editing to provide static and dynamic feedback to the programmer in a maximally live manner, i.e. for every possible editor state. Hazel is the first maximally live environment for a general-purpose functional language.

We propose a novel trace-guided approach to tackle the challenges of ambiguity and generalization in synthesis of recursive functional programs from input-output examples. Our approach augments the search space of programs with recursion traces consisting of recursive subcalls of the programs. Our method is based on a new version space algebra (VSA) for succinct representation and efficient manipulation of pairs of recursion traces and programs that are consistent with each other. We have implemented this approach in a tool called SyRup and evaluated it on benchmarks from prior work. Our evaluation demonstrates that SyRup not only requires fewer examples to achieve a certain success rate than existing synthesizers, but is also less sensitive to the quality of the examples.