Modern code completion engines, powered by large language models (LLMs), assist millions of developers with their strong capabilities to generate functionally correct code. Due to this popularity, it is crucial to investigate the security implications of relying on LLM-based code completion. In this work, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art black-box LLM-based code completion engines can be stealthily biased by adversaries to significantly increase their rate of insecure code generation. We present the first attack, named INSEC, that achieves this goal. INSEC works by injecting an attack string as a short comment in the completion input. The attack string is crafted through a query-based optimization procedure starting from a set of carefully designed initialization schemes. We demonstrate INSEC's broad applicability and effectiveness by evaluating it on various state-of-the-art open-source models and black-box commercial services (e.g., OpenAI API and GitHub Copilot). On a diverse set of security-critical test cases, covering 16 CWEs across 5 programming languages, INSEC increases the rate of generated insecure code by more than 50%, while maintaining the functional correctness of generated code. We consider INSEC practical - it requires low resources and costs less than 10 US dollars to develop on commodity hardware. Moreover, we showcase the attack's real-world deployability, by developing an IDE plug-in that stealthily injects INSEC into the GitHub Copilot extension.

Large language models (large LMs) are susceptible to producing text that contains hallucinated content. An important instance of this problem is self-contradiction, where the LM generates two contradictory sentences within the same context. In this work, we present a comprehensive investigation into self-contradiction for various instruction-tuned LMs, covering evaluation, detection, and mitigation. Our primary evaluation task is open-domain text generation, but we also demonstrate the applicability of our approach to shorter question answering. Our analysis reveals the prevalence of self-contradictions, e.g., in 17.7% of all sentences produced by ChatGPT. We then propose a novel prompting-based framework designed to effectively detect and mitigate self-contradictions. Our detector achieves high accuracy, e.g., around 80% F1 score when prompting ChatGPT. The mitigation algorithm iteratively refines the generated text to remove contradictory information while preserving text fluency and informativeness. Importantly, our entire framework is applicable to black-box LMs and does not require retrieval of external knowledge. Rather, our method complements retrieval-based methods, as a large portion of self-contradictions (e.g., 35.2% for ChatGPT) cannot be verified using online text. Our approach is practically effective and has been released as a push-button tool to benefit the public at https://chatprotect.ai/.