We study truthful and non-truthful protocols for combinatorial auctions in which every item can be allocated to one of two agents (multigraphs), or more generally to a fixed number of agents (hypergraphs). We show some tight - both positive and impossibility - results for the communication complexity of approximating the optimal social welfare for general monotone, subadditive, or XOS valuations.

We show that the best approximation ratio of deterministic truthful mechanisms for makespan-minimization for n unrelated machines is n , as it was conjectured by Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen.

We study a game-theoretic model for pool formation in Proof of Stake blockchain protocols. In such systems, stakeholders can form pools as a means of obtaining regular rewards from participation in ledger maintenance, with the power of each pool being dependent on its collective stake. The question we are interested in is the design of mechanisms, i.e., "reward sharing schemes," that suitably split rewards among pool members and achieve favorable properties in the resulting pool configuration. With this in mind, we initiate a non-cooperative game-theoretic analysis of the well known Shapley value scheme from cooperative game theory into the context of blockchains. In particular, we focus on the oceanic model of games, proposed by Milnor and Shapley (1978), which is suitable for populations where a small set of large players coexists with a big mass of rather small, negligible players. This provides an appropriate level of abstraction for pool formation processes that occur among the stakeholders of a blockchain. We provide comparisons between the Shapley mechanism and the more standard proportional scheme, in terms of attained decentralization, via a Price of Stability analysis and in terms of susceptibility to Sybil attacks, i.e., the strategic splitting of a players' stake with the intention of participating in multiple pools for increased profit. Interestingly, while the widely deployed proportional scheme appears to have certain advantages, the Shapley value scheme, which rewards higher the most pivotal players, emerges as a competitive alternative, by being able to bypass some of the downsides of proportional sharing in terms of Sybil attack susceptibility, while also not being far from optimal guarantees w.r.t. decentralization. Finally, we also complement our study with some variations of proportional sharing, where the profit is split in proportion to a superadditive or a subadditive function of the stake, showing that our results for the Shapley value scheme are maintained in comparison to these functions as well.

Abstract. We consider mechanisms for scheduling [Formula: see text] unrelated machines when the valuations of the players (i.e., machines) are submodular. We give a lower bound of [Formula: see text] on the approximation ratio of incentive compatible deterministic mechanisms. This lower bound holds for supermodular valuations and also when all players, except for one, have additive valuations. This is an information-theoretic impossibility result on the approximation ratio of mechanisms that provides strong evidence for the Nisan–Ronen conjecture, which states that the approximation ratio is [Formula: see text] when the valuations of all machines are additive. Our approach is based on a novel multiplayer characterization of appropriately selected instances that allows us to focus on a particular type of algorithm, linear mechanisms, and it is a potential stepping stone towards the full resolution of the Nisan–Ronen conjecture.

Handling congestion in blockchain systems is a fundamental problem given that the security and decentralization objectives of such systems lead to designs that compromise on (horizontal) scalability (what sometimes is referred to as the “blockchain trilemma”). Motivated by this, we focus on the question whether it is possible to design a transaction inclusion policy for block producers that facilitates fee and delay predictability while being incentive compatible at the same time. Reconciling these three properties is seemingly paradoxical given that the dominant approach to transaction processing is based on first-price auctions (e.g., as in Bitcoin) or dynamic adjustment of the minimum admissible fee (e.g. as in Ethereum EIP-1559) something that breaks fee predictability. At the same time, in fixed fee mechanisms (e.g., as in Cardano), fees are trivially predictable but are subject to relatively inexpensive bribing or denial of service attacks where transactions may be delayed indefinitely by a well funded attacker, hence breaking delay predictability. In this work, we set out to address this problem by putting forward blockchain space tokenization (BST), namely a new capability of a blockchain system to tokenize its capacity for transactions and allocate it to interested users who are willing to pay ahead of time for the ability to post transactions regularly for a period of time. We analyze our system in the face of worst-case transaction-processing attacks by introducing a security game played between the mempool mechanism and an adversary. Leveraging this framework, we prove that BST offers predictable and asymptotically optimal delays, predictable fees, and is incentive compatible, thus answering the question posed in the affirmative.

We study envy freeness up to any good (EFX) in settings where valuations can be represented via a graph of arbitrary size where vertices correspond to agents and edges to items. An item (edge) has zero marginal value to all agents (vertices) not incident to the edge. Each vertex may have an arbitrary monotone valuation on the set of incident edges. We first consider allocations that correspond to orientations of the edges, where we show that EFX does not always exist, and furthermore that it is NP-complete to decide whether an EFX orientation exists. Our main result is that (EFX) allocations exist for this setting. This is one of the few cases where EFX allocations are known to exist for more than 3 agents.

Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen conjectured that the best approximation ratio of deterministic truthful mechanisms for makespan-minimization for n unrelated machines is n. This work validates the conjecture.

The Nisan-Ronen conjecture states that no truthful mechanism for makespan-minimization when allocating$m$tasks to$n$unrelated machines can have approximation ratio less than n. Over more than two decades since its formulation, little progress has been made in resolving it and the best known lower bound is still a small constant. This work makes progress towards validating the conjecture by showing a lower bound of 1+ ✓$n$-1.

We study truthful mechanisms for allocation problems in graphs, both for the minimization (i.e., scheduling) and maximization (i.e., auctions) setting. The minimization problem is a special case of the well-studied unrelated machines scheduling problem, in which every given task can be executed only by two pre-specified machines in the case of graphs or a given subset of machines in the case of hypergraphs. This corresponds to a multigraph whose nodes are the machines and its hyperedges are the tasks. This class of problems belongs to multidimensional mechanism design, for which there are no known general mechanisms other than the VCG and its generalization to affine minimizers. We propose a new class of mechanisms that are truthful and have significantly better performance than affine minimizers in many settings. Specifically, we provide upper and lower bounds for truthful mechanisms for general multigraphs, as well as special classes of graphs such as stars, trees, planar graphs, $k$-degenerate graphs, and graphs of a given treewidth. We also consider the objective of minimizing or maximizing the $L^p$-norm of the values of the players, a generalization of the makespan minimization that corresponds to $p=\infty$, and extend the results to any $p>0$.

The $k$-server conjecture, first posed by Manasse, McGeoch and Sleator in 1988, states that a $k$-competitive deterministic algorithm for the $k$-server problem exists. It is conjectured that the work function algorithm (WFA) achieves this guarantee, a multi-purpose algorithm with applications to various online problems. This has been shown for several special cases: $k=2$, $(k+1)$-point metrics, $(k+2)$-point metrics, the line metric, weighted star metrics, and $k=3$ in the Manhattan plane. The known proofs of these results are based on potential functions tied to each particular special case, thus requiring six different potential functions for the six cases. We present a single potential function proving $k$-competitiveness of WFA for all these cases. We also use this potential to show $k$-competitiveness of WFA on multiray spaces and for $k=3$ on trees. While the DoubleCoverage algorithm was known to be $k$-competitive for these latter cases, it has been open for WFA. Our potential captures a type of lazy adversary and thus shows that in all settled cases, the worst-case adversary is lazy. Chrobak and Larmore conjectured in 1992 that a potential capturing the lazy adversary would resolve the $k$-server conjecture. To our major surprise, this is not the case, as we show (using connections to the $k$-taxi problem) that our potential fails for three servers on the circle. Thus, our potential highlights laziness of the adversary as a fundamental property that is shared by all settled cases but violated in general. On the one hand, this weakens our confidence in the validity of the $k$-server conjecture. On the other hand, if the $k$-server conjecture holds, then we believe it can be proved by a variant of our potential.

We study a variant of the k -server problem, the infinite server problem, in which infinitely many servers reside initially at a particular point of the metric space and serve a sequence of requests. In the framework of competitive analysis, we show a surprisingly tight connection between this problem and the resource augmentation version of the k -server problem, also known as the (h,k) -server problem, in which an online algorithm with k servers competes against an offline algorithm with h servers. Specifically, we show that the infinite server problem has bounded competitive ratio if and only if the (h,k) -server problem has bounded competitive ratio for some k = O ( h ). We give a lower bound of 3.146 for the competitive ratio of the infinite server problem, which holds even for the line and some simple weighted stars. It implies the same lower bound for the (h,k) -server problem on the line, even when k/h → ∞, improving on the previous known bounds of 2 for the line and 2.4 for general metrics. For weighted trees and layered graphs, we obtain upper bounds, although they depend on the depth. Of particular interest is the infinite server problem on the line, which we show to be equivalent to the seemingly easier case in which all requests are in a fixed bounded interval. This is a special case of a more general reduction from arbitrary metric spaces to bounded subspaces. Unfortunately, classical approaches (double coverage and generalizations, work function algorithm, balancing algorithms) fail even for this special case.

We introduce and study reward sharing schemes (RSS) that promote the fair formation of stake pools in collaborative projects that involve a large number of stakeholders such as the maintenance of a proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain. Our mechanisms are parameterized by a target value for the desired number of pools. We show that by properly incentivizing participants, the desired number of stake pools is a Nash equilibrium arising from rational play. Our equilibria also exhibit an efficiency / security tradeoff via a parameter that calibrates between including pools with the smallest cost and providing protection against Sybil attacks, the setting where a single stakeholder creates a large number of pools in the hopes to dominate the collaborative project. We then describe how RSS can be deployed in the PoS setting, mitigating a number of potential deployment attacks and protocol deviations that include censoring transactions, performing Sybil attacks with the objective to control the majority of stake, lying about the actual cost and others. Finally, we experimentally demonstrate fast convergence to equilibria in dynamic environments where players react to each other's strategic moves over an indefinite period of interactive play. We also show how simple reward sharing schemes that are seemingly more “fair”, perhaps counterin-tuitively, converge to centralized equilibria.

We consider incentive compatible mechanisms for a domain that is very close to the domain of scheduling n unrelated machines: the single exception is that the valuation of just one machine is submodular. For the scheduling problem with such cost functions, we give a lower bound of Ω(√n) on the approximation ratio of incentive compatible deterministic mechanisms. This is a strong information-theoretic impossibility result on the approximation ratio of mechanisms that provides strong evidence for the Nisan-Ronen conjecture. This is the first non-constant lower bound that assumes no restriction on the mechanism side; in contrast, all previous general results hold for only special classes of mechanisms such as local, strongly monotone, and anonymous mechanisms. Our approach is based on a novel multi-player characterization of appropriately selected instances that allows us to focus on particular type of algorithms, linear mechanisms, and it is a potential stepping stone towards the full resolution of the conjecture.

We study online competitive algorithms for the \emph{line chasing problem} in Euclidean spaces $\reals^d$, where the input consists of an initial point $P_0$ and a sequence of lines $X_1,X_2,...,X_m$, revealed one at a time. At each step $t$, when the line $X_t$ is revealed, the algorithm must determine a point $P_t\in X_t$. An online algorithm is called $c$-competitive if for any input sequence the path $P_0, P_1,...,P_m$ it computes has length at most $c$ times the optimum path. The line chasing problem is a variant of a more general convex body chasing problem, where the sets $X_t$ are arbitrary convex sets. To date, the best competitive ratio for the line chasing problem was $28.1$, even in the plane. We significantly improve this bound, by providing a~$3$-competitive algorithm for any dimension $d$. We also improve the lower bound on the competitive ratio, from $1.412$ to $1.5358$.

Price of anarchy quantifies the degradation of social welfare in games due to the lack of a centralized authority that can enforce the optimal outcome. At its antipodes, mechanism design studies how to ameliorate these effects by incentivizing socially desirable behavior and implementing the optimal state as equilibrium. In practice, the responsiveness to such measures depends on the wealth of each individual. This leads to a natural, but largely unexplored, question. Does optimal mechanism design entrench, or maybe even exacerbate, social inequality? We study this question in nonatomic congestion games, arguably one of the most thoroughly studied settings from the perspectives of price of anarchy as well as mechanism design. We introduce a new model that incorporates the wealth distribution of the population and captures the income elasticity of travel time. This allows us to argue about the equality of wealth distribution both before and after employing a mechanism. We start our analysis by establishing a broad qualitative result, showing that tolls always increase inequality in symmetric congestion games under any reasonable metric of inequality, e.g., the Gini index. Next, we introduce the iniquity index, a novel measure for quantifying the magnitude of these forces towards a more unbalanced wealth distribution and show it has good normative properties (robustness to scaling of income, no-regret learning). We analyze iniquity both in theoretical settings (Pigou's network under various wealth distributions) as well as experimental ones (based on a large scale field experiment in Singapore). Finally, we provide an algorithm for computing optimal tolls for any point of the trade-off of relative importance of efficiency and equality. We conclude with a discussion of our findings in the context of theories of justice as developed in contemporary social sciences.

We consider the online k-taxi problem, a generalization of the k-server problem, in which k taxis serve a sequence of requests in a metric space. A request consists of two points s and t, representing a passenger that wants to be carried by a taxi from s to t. The goal is to serve all requests while minimizing the total distance traveled by all taxis. The problem comes in two flavors, called the easy and the hard k-taxi problem: In the easy k-taxi problem, the cost is defined as the total distance traveled by the taxis; in the hard k-taxi problem, the cost is only the distance of empty runs.

We study the strategic implications that arise from adding one extra option to the miners participating in the bitcoin protocol. We propose that when adding a block, miners also have the ability to pay forward an amount to be collected by the first miner who successfully extends their branch, giving them the power to influence the incentives for mining. We formulate a stochastic game for the study of such incentives and show that with this added option, smaller miners can guarantee that the best response of even substantially more powerful miners is to follow the expected behavior intended by the protocol designer.

We develop a general duality-theory framework for revenue maximization in additive Bayesian auctions. The framework extends linear programming duality and complementarity to constraints with partial derivatives. The dual system reveals the geometric nature of the problem and highlights its connection with the theory of bipartite graph matchings. We demonstrate the power of the framework by applying it to a multiple-good monopoly setting where the buyer has uniformly distributed valuations for the items, the canonical long-standing open problem in the area. We propose a deterministic selling mechanism called straight-jacket auction (SJA), which we prove to be exactly optimal for up to six items, and conjecture its optimality for any number of goods. The duality framework is used not only for proving optimality, but perhaps more importantly for deriving the optimal mechanism itself; as a result, SJA is defined by natural geometric constraints.

We study a dynamic market setting where an intermediary interacts with an unknown large sequence of agents that can be either sellers or buyers: their identities, as well as the sequence length n, are decided in an adversarial, online way. Each agent is interested in trading a single item, and all items in the market are identical. The intermediary has some prior, incomplete knowledge of the agents' values for the items: all seller values are independently drawn from the same distribution F_S, and all buyer values from F_B. The two distributions may differ, and we make common regularity assumptions, namely that F_B is MHR and F_S is log-concave. We focus on online, posted-price mechanisms, and analyse two objectives: that of maximizing the intermediary's profit and that of maximizing the social welfare, under a competitive analysis benchmark. First, on the negative side, for general agent sequences we prove tight competitive ratios of Theta(\sqrt(n)) and Theta(\ln n), respectively for the two objectives. On the other hand, under the extra assumption that the intermediary knows some bound \alpha on the ratio between the number of sellers and buyers, we design asymptotically optimal online mechanisms with competitive ratios of 1+o(1) and 4, respectively. Additionally, we study the model where the number of items that can be stored in stock throughout the execution is bounded, in which case the competitive ratio for the profit is improved to O(ln n).

We consider the online carpool fairness problem of [Fagin and Williams, 1983] in which an online algorithm is presented with a sequence of pairs drawn from a group of n potential drivers. The online algorithm must select one driver from each pair, with the objective of partitioning the driving burden as fairly as possible for all drivers. The unfairness of an online algorithm is a measure of the worst-case deviation between the number of times a person has driven and the number of times they would have driven if life was completely fair. We introduce a version of the problem in which drivers only carpool with their neighbors in a given social network graph; this is a generalization of the original problem, which corresponds to the social network of the complete graph. We show that for graphs of degree d, the unfairness of deterministic algorithms against adversarial sequences is exactly d/2. For random sequences of edges from planar graph social networks we give a [deterministic] algorithm with logarithmic unfairness (holds more generally for any bounded-genus graph). This does not follow from previous random sequence results in the original model, as we show that restricting the random sequences to sparse social network graphs may increase the unfairness. A very natural class of randomized online algorithms are so-called static algorithms that preserve the same state distribution over time. Surprisingly, we show that any such algorithm has unfairness ~Theta(sqrt(d)) against oblivious adversaries. This shows that the local random greedy algorithm of [Ajtai et al, 1996] is close to optimal amongst the class of static algorithms. A natural (non-static) algorithm is global random greedy (which acts greedily and breaks ties at random). We improve the lower bound on the competitive ratio from Omega(log^{1/3}(d)) to Omega(log(d)). We also show that the competitive ratio of global random greedy against adaptive adversaries is Omega(d).

Consider the pricing problem faced by FedEx. Each customer has a package to ship, a deadline $d$ by which he needs his package to arrive, and a value $v$ for a guarantee that the package will arrive by his deadline. FedEx can (and does) offer a number of different shipping options in order to extract more revenue from their customers. In this paper, we solve the optimal (revenue-maximizing) auction problem for the single-agent version of this problem. Our paper adds to the relatively short list of multi-parameter settings for which a closed-form solution is known.

We study the strategic considerations of miners participating in the bitcoin's protocol. We formulate and study the stochastic game that underlies these strategic considerations. The miners collectively build a tree of blocks, and they are paid when they create a node (mine a block) which will end up in the path of the tree that is adopted by all. Since the miners can hide newly mined nodes, they play a game with incomplete information. Here we consider two simplified forms of this game in which the miners have complete information. In the simplest game the miners release every mined block immediately, but are strategic on which blocks to mine. In the second more complicated game, when a block is mined it is announced immediately, but it may not be released so that other miners cannot continue mining from it. A miner not only decides which blocks to mine, but also when to release blocks to other miners. In both games, we show that when the computational power of each miner is relatively small, their best response matches the expected behavior of the bitcoin designer. However, when the computational power of a miner is large, he deviates from the expected behavior, and other Nash equilibria arise.

We derive exact optimal solutions for the problem of optimizing revenue in single-bidder multi-item auctions for uniform i.i.d. valuations. We give optimal auctions of up to 6 items; previous results were only known for up to three items. To do so, we develop a general duality framework for the general problem of maximizing revenue in many-bidders multi-item additive Bayesian auctions with continuous probability valuation distributions. The framework extends linear programming duality and complementarity to constraints with partial derivatives. The dual system reveals the geometric nature of the problem and highlights its connection with the theory of bipartite graph matchings. The duality framework is used not only for proving optimality, but perhaps more importantly, for deriving the optimal auction; as a result, the optimal auction is defined by natural geometric constraints.

We introduce and study strongly truthful mechanisms and their applications. We use strongly truthful mechanisms as a tool for implementation in undominated strategies for several problems, including the design of externality resistant auctions and a variant of multi-dimensional scheduling.

We construct prior-free auctions with constant-factor approximation guarantees with ordered bidders, in both unlimited and limited supply settings. We compare the expected revenue of our auctions on a bid vector to the monotone price benchmark, the maximum revenue that can be obtained from a bid vector using supply-respecting prices that are nonincreasing in the bidder ordering and bounded above by the second-highest bid. As a consequence, our auctions are simultaneously near-optimal in a wide range of Bayesian multi-unit environments.

A Nash Equilibrium is a joint strategy profile at which each agent myopically plays a best response to the other agents' strategies, ignoring the possibility that deviating from the equilibrium could lead to an avalanche of successive changes by other agents. However, such changes could potentially be beneficial to the agent, creating incentive to act non-myopically, so as to take advantage of others' responses. To study this phenomenon, we consider a non-myopic Cournot competition, where each firm selects whether it wants to maximize profit (as in the classical Cournot competition) or to maximize revenue (by masquerading as a firm with zero production costs). The key observation is that profit may actually be higher when acting to maximize revenue, (1) which will depress market prices, (2) which will reduce the production of other firms, (3) which will gain market share for the revenue maximizing firm, (4) which will, overall, increase profits for the revenue maximizing firm. Implicit in this line of thought is that one might take other firms’ responses into account when choosing a market strategy. The Nash Equilibria of the non-myopic Cournot competition capture this action/response issue appropriately, and this work is a step towards understanding the impact of such strategic manipulative play in markets. We study the properties of Nash Equilibria of non-myopic Cournot competition with linear demand functions and show existence of pure Nash Equilibria, that simple best response dynamics will produce such an equilibrium, and that for some natural dynamics this convergence is within linear time. This is in contrast to the well known fact that best response dynamics need not converge in the standard myopic Cournot competition. Furthermore, we compare the outcome of the non-myopic Cournot competition with that of the standard myopic Cournot competition. Not surprisingly, perhaps, prices in the non-myopic game are lower and the firms, in total, produce more and have a lower aggregate utility.

Scheduling on unrelated machines is one of the most general and classical variants of the task scheduling problem. Fractional scheduling is the LP-relaxation of the problem, which is polynomially solvable in the nonstrategic setting, and is a useful tool to design deterministic and randomized approximation algorithms. The mechanism design version of the scheduling problem was introduced by Nisan and Ronen. In this article, we consider the mechanism design version of the fractional variant of this problem. We give lower bounds for any fractional truthful mechanism. Our lower bounds also hold for any (randomized) mechanism for the integral case. In the positive direction, we propose a truthful mechanism that achieves approximation 3/2 for 2 machines, matching the lower bound. This is the first new tight bound on the approximation ratio of this problem, after the tight bound of 2, for 2 machines, obtained by Nisan and Ronen. For n machines, our mechanism achieves an approximation ratio of n +1/2. Motivated by the fact that all the known deterministic and randomized mechanisms for the problem assign each task independently from the others, we focus on an interesting subclass of allocation algorithms, the task-independent algorithms. We give a lower bound of n +1/2, that holds for every (not only monotone) allocation algorithm that takes independent decisions. Under this consideration, our truthful independent mechanism is the best that we can hope from this family of algorithms.

We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling tasks on n unrelated machines in which the machines are the players of the mechanism. The problem was proposed and studied in the seminal paper of Nisan and Ronen on algorithmic mechanism design, where it was shown that the approximation ratio of mechanisms is between 2 and n. We improve the lower bound to $1+\sqrt{2}$ for 3 or more machines.

We consider the price of anarchy of pure Nash equilibria in congestion games with linear latency functions. For asymmetric games, the price of anarchy of maximum social cost is Θ(√N), where N is the number of players. For all other cases of symmetric or asymmetric games and for both maximum and average social cost, the price of anarchy is 5/2. We extend the results to latency functions that are polynomials of bounded degree. We also extend some of the results to mixed Nash equilibria.

We develop a theoretical framework to characterize the hardness of indexing data sets on block-access memory devices like hard disks. We define an indexing workload by a data set and a set of potential queries. For a workload, we can construct an indexing scheme, which is a collection of fixed-sized subsets of the data. We identify two measures of efficiency for an indexing scheme on a workload: storage redundancy, r (how many times each item in the data set is stored), and access overhead, A (how many times more blocks than necessary does a query retrieve).For many interesting families of workloads, there exists a trade-off between storage redundancy and access overhead. Given a desired access overhead A , there is a minimum redundancy that any indexing scheme must exhibit. We prove a lower-bound theorem for deriving the minimum redundancy. By applying this theorem, we show interesting upper and lower bounds and trade-offs between A and r in the case of multidimensional range queries and set queries.

One of the crucial elements in the Internet's success is its ability to adequately control congestion. The paper defines and solves several optimization problems related to Internet congestion control, as a step toward understanding the virtues of the TCP congestion control algorithm currently used and comparing it with alternative algorithms. We focus on regulating the rate of a single unicast flow when the bandwidth available to it is unknown and may change over time. We determine near-optimal policies when the available bandwidth is unchanging, and near-optimal competitive policies when the available bandwidth is changing in a restricted manner under the control of an adversary.

The competitive analysis of online algorithms has been criticized as being too crude and unrealistic. We propose refinements of competitive analysis in two directions: The first restricts the power of the adversary by allowing only certain input distributions, while the other allows for comparisons between information regimes for online decision-making. We illustrate the first with an application to the paging problem; as a byproduct we characterize completely the work functions of this important special case of the k-server problem. We use the second refinement to explore the power of lookahead in server and task systems.

We study the k-server problem when the offline algorithm has fewer than k servers. We give two upper bounds of the cost WFA(/spl rho/) of the Work Function Algorithm. The first upper bound is kOPT/sub h/(/spl rho/)+(h-1)OPT/sub k/(/spl rho/), where OPT/sub m/(/spl rho/) denotes the optimal cost to service /spl rho/ by m servers. The second upper bound is 2hOPTh(/spl rho/)-OPT/sub k/(/spl rho/) for h/spl les/k. Both bounds imply that the Work Function Algorithm is (2k-1)-competitive. Perhaps more important is our technique which seems promising for settling the k-server conjecture. The proofs are simple and intuitive and they do not involve potential functions. We also apply the technique to give a simple condition for the Work Function Algorithm to be k-competitive; this condition results in a new proof that the k-server conjecture holds for k=2.

We show that no algorithm exists for deciding whether a finite task for three or more processors is wait-free solvable in the asynchronous read-write shared-memory model. This impossibility result implies that there is no constructive (recursive) characterization of wait-free solvable tasks. It also applies to other shared-memory models of distributed computing, such as the comparison-based model.

We study the trade-off between storage redundancy and access overhead for range queries, using the framework of [6]. We show that the Fibonacci workload of size n, which is the regular 2-dimensional grid rotated by the golden ratio, does not admit an indexing scheme with access overhead less than the block size B (the worst possible access overhead) , even for storage redundancy as high as c log n, for some constant c. We also show that this bound is tight (up to a constant factor) by providing an indexing scheme with storage redundancy \\Theta(log n) and constant access overhead, for any 2-dimensional workload. We extend the lower bound to random point sets and show that if the maximum storage redundancy is less than cloglog n, the access overhead is B. Finally, we explore the relation between indexability and fractal (Hausdorff) dimension of point sets. 1 Introduction In this paper we continue the work of [6] towards a theory of indexability ---that is, towards a better understandin...

We consider the problem of indexing general database workloads (combinations of data sets and sets of potential queries). We define a framework for measuring the efficiency of an indexing scheme for a workload based on two characterizations: storage redundancy (how many times each item in the data set is stored), and access overhead (how many times more blocks than necessary does a query retrieve). Using this framework we present some initial results, showing upper and lower bounds and trade-offs between them in the case of multi-dimensional range queries and set queries. 1 Introduction The success and ubiquity of the relational data model arguably owes much to the B-tree, the access method breakthrough that accompanied it with superb timing [2]. It seems likely that access methods will continue to play an important role in, and largely determine the viability of, the novel data models currently under intense scrutiny in the database research community. The B-tree is widely recognized...

We consider the special case of the traveling salesman problem (TSP) in which the distance metric is the shortest-path metric of a planar unweighted graph. We present a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) for this problem.

No abstract available.

We prove that the work function algorithm for the k -server problem has a competitive ratio at most 2 k −1. Manasse et al. [1988] conjectured that the competitive ratio for the k -server problem is exactly k (it is trivially at least k ); previously the best-known upper bound was exponential in k . Our proof involves three crucial ingredients: A quasiconvexity property of work functions, a duality lemma that uses quasiconvexity to characterize the configuration that achieve maximum increase of the work function, and a potential function that exploits the duality lemma.

The competitive analysis of on-line algorithms has been criticized as being too crude and unrealistic. We propose two refinements of competitive analysis an two directions: The first restricts the power of the adversary by allowing only certain input distributions, while the other allows for comparisons between information regimes for on-line decision-making. We illustrate the first with an application to the paging problem; as a by product we characterize completely the work functions of this important special case of the k-server problem. We use the second refinement to explore the power of lookahead in server systems, and the power of visual sensors in robot navigation.>

Article On the k-server conjecture Share on Authors: Elias Koutsoupias University of California, San Diego University of California, San DiegoView Profile , Christos Papadimitriou University of California, San Diego University of California, San DiegoView Profile Authors Info & Claims STOC '94: Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of ComputingMay 1994 Pages 507–511https://doi.org/10.1145/195058.195245Online:23 May 1994Publication History 38citation251DownloadsMetricsTotal Citations38Total Downloads251Last 12 Months4Last 6 weeks0 Get Citation AlertsNew Citation Alert added!This alert has been successfully added and will be sent to:You will be notified whenever a record that you have chosen has been cited.To manage your alert preferences, click on the button below.Manage my AlertsNew Citation Alert!Please log in to your account Save to BinderSave to BinderCreate a New BinderNameCancelCreateExport CitationPublisher SiteGet Access

We show that bisecting a polygon into two equal (possibly disconnected) parts with the smallest possible total perimeter is NP-complete, and it is in fact NP-hard to approximate within any ratio. In contrast, we give a dynamic programming algorithm which finds a subdivision into two parts with total perimeter at most that of the optimum bisection, such that the two parts have areas within ε of each other; the time is polynomial in the number of sides of the polygon, and 1/ε. When the polygon is convex, or if the parts are required to be connected, then the exact problem can be solved in quadratic time. INFORMS Journal on Computing, ISSN 1091-9856, was published as ORSA Journal on Computing from 1989 to 1995 under ISSN 0899-1499.

We give a polynomial approximation sceme for subdividing a simple polygon into approximately equal parts by curves of the smallest possible total length. For convex polygons we show that an exact fast algorithm is possible. Several generalizations are shown NP-complete.