Decentralized Finance (DeFi), in which digital assets are exchanged without trusted intermediaries, has grown rapidly in value in recent years. Stablecoins , which are pegged to a non-volatile asset such as the US dollar, are a prominent feature of DeFi as they mitigate the risk associated with price fluctuations. However, existing stablecoin systems are tied to individual blockchain platforms, and trusted parties or complex protocols are needed to exchange stablecoin tokens between blockchains. Our goal is to design a practical stablecoin system for cross-chain commerce, and to do so we must overcome two main challenges. The first is to support a large and growing number of blockchains efficiently. The second is for the stablecoin to be resilient to blockchain platform failures and to price fluctuations that affect its collateral. We present CroCoDai to address these challenges. We demonstrate CroCoDai ’s efficiency by comparing the performance of a prototype implementation to related baselines, and its resilience through an empirical analysis of historical token price data.

A plethora of different blockchain platforms have emerged in recent years, but many of them operate in silos. As such, there is a need for reliable cross-chain communication to enable blockchain interoperability. Blockchain interoperability is challenging because transactions can typically not be reverted – as such, if one transaction is committed then the protocol must ensure that all related transactions are committed as well. Existing interoperability approaches, e.g., Cosmos and Polkadot, are limited in the sense that they only support interoperability between their own subchains, or require intrusive changes to existing blockchains. To overcome this limitation, we propose PIEChain, a general, Kafka-based cross-chain communication framework. We utilize PIEChain for a practical case study: a cross-chain auction in which users who hold tokens on multiple chains bid for a ticket sold on another chain. PIEChain is the first publicly available, practical implementation of a general framework for cross-chain communication.

Smart grids leverage the data collected from smart meters to make important operational decisions. However, they are vulnerable to False Data Injection (FDI) attacks in which an attacker manipulates meter data to disrupt the grid operations. Existing works on FDI are based on a simple threat model in which a single grid operator has access to all the data, and only some meters can be compromised.

Smart cities deploy large numbers of sensors and collect a tremendous amount of data from them. For example, Advanced Metering Infrastructures (AMIs), which consist of physical meters that collect usage data about public utilities such as power and water, are an important building block in a smart city. In a typical sensor network, the measurement devices are connected through a computer network, which exposes them to cyber attacks. Furthermore, the data is centrally managed at the operator’s servers, making it vulnerable to insider threats.Our goal is to protect the integrity of data collected by large-scale sensor networks and the firmware in measurement devices from cyber attacks and insider threats. To this end, we first develop a comprehensive threat model for attacks against data and firmware integrity, which can target any of the stakeholders in the operation of the sensor network. Next, we use our threat model to analyze existing defense mechanisms, including signature checks, remote firmware attestation, anomaly detection, and blockchain-based secure logs. However, the large size of the Trusted Computing Base and a lack of scalability limit the applicability of these existing mechanisms. We propose the Feather-Light Blockchain Infrastructure (FLBI) framework to address these limitations. Our framework leverages a two-layer architecture and cryptographic threshold signature chains to support large networks of low-capacity devices such as meters and data aggregators. We have fully implemented the FLBI’s end-to-end functionality on the Hyperledger Fabric and private Ethereum blockchain platforms. Our experiments show that the FLBI is able to support millions of end devices.

Participation in permissionless blockchains results in competition over system resources, which needs to be controlled with fees. Until recently, Ethereum's fee mechanism was implemented via a first-price auction that resulted in unpredictable fees as well as other inefficiencies. Launched on August 5, 2021, EIP-1559 is an improved proposal that introduces a number of innovative features such as a dynamically adaptive basefee that is burnt, instead of being paid to the miners. Despite intense interest in understanding its properties, several basic questions such as whether and under what conditions does this protocol self-stabilize have remained elusive thus far.

Clients of permissionless blockchain systems, like Bitcoin, rely on an underlying peer-to-peer network to send and receive transactions. It is critical that a client is connected to at least one honest peer, as otherwise the client can be convinced to accept a maliciously forked view of the blockchain. In such aneclipse attack, the client is unable to reliably distinguish the canonical view of the blockchain from the view provided by the attacker. The consequences of this can be catastrophic if the client makes business decisions based on a distorted view of the blockchain transactions. In this paper, we investigate the design space and propose two approaches for Bitcoin clients to detect whether an eclipse attack against them is ongoing. Each approach chooses a different trade-off between average attack detection time and network load. The first scheme is based on the detection of suspicious block timestamps. The second scheme allows blockchain clients to utilize their natural connections to the Internet (i.e., standard Web activity) to gossip about their blockchain views with contacted servers and their other clients. Our proposals improve upon previously proposed eclipse attack countermeasures without introducing any dedicated infrastructure or changes to the Bitcoin protocol and network, and we discuss an implementation. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the gossip-based schemes through rigorous analysis using original Internet traffic traces and real-world deployment. The results indicate that our protocol incurs a negligible overhead and detects eclipse attacks rapidly with high probability, and is well-suited for practical deployment.

Consensus protocols are currently the bottlenecks that prevent blockchain systems from scaling. However, we argue that transaction execution is also important to the performance and security of blockchains. In other words, there are ample opportunities to speed up and further secure blockchains by reducing the cost of transaction execution. Our goal is to understand how much we can speed up blockchains by exploiting transaction concurrency available in blockchain workloads. To this end, we first analyze historical data of seven major public blockchains, namely Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, Litecoin, Dogecoin, Ethereum, Ethereum Classic, and Zilliqa. We consider two metrics for concurrency, namely the single-transaction conflict rate per block, and the group conflict rate per block. We find that there is more concurrency in UTXO-based blockchains than in account-based ones, although the amount of concurrency in the former is lower than expected. Another interesting finding is that some blockchains with larger blocks have more concurrency than blockchains with smaller blocks. Next, we propose an analytical model for estimating the transaction execution speed-up given an amount of concurrency. Using results from our empirical analysis, the model estimates that 6× speed-ups in Ethereum can be achieved if all available concurrency is exploited.

We study the problem of making forecasts about the future availability of bicycles in stations of a bike-sharing system (BSS). This is relevant in order to make recommendations guaranteeing that the probability that a user will be able to make a journey is sufficiently high. To do this we use probabilistic predictions obtained from a queuing theoretical time-inhomogeneous model of a BSS. The model is parametrized and successfully validated using historical data from the Vélib' BSS of the City of Paris.