Semi-Supervised Federated Learning (SSFL) is gaining popularity over conventional Federated Learning in many real-world applications. Due to the practical limitation of limited labeled data on the client side, SSFL considers that participating clients train with unlabeled data, and only the central server has the necessary resources to access limited labeled data, making it an ideal fit for real-world applications (e.g., healthcare). However, traditional SSFL assumes that the data distributions in the training phase and testing phase are the same. In practice, however, domain shifts frequently occur, making it essential for SSFL to incorporate generalization capabilities and enhance their practicality. The core challenge is improving model generalization to new, unseen domains while the client participate in SSFL. However, the decentralized setup of SSFL and unsupervised client training necessitates innovation to achieve improved generalization across domains. To achieve this, we propose a novel framework called the Unified Alignment Protocol (UAP), which consists of an alternating two-stage training process. The first stage involves training the server model to learn and align the features with a parametric distribution, which is subsequently communicated to clients without additional communication overhead. The second stage proposes a novel training algorithm that utilizes the server feature distribution to align client features accordingly. Our extensive experiments on standard domain generalization benchmark datasets across multiple model architectures reveal that proposed UAP successfully achieves SOTA generalization performance in SSFL setting. Our code is available at https://github.com/ML-SecurityResearch-LAB/UAP.

Recent advancements in side-channel attacks have revealed the vulnerability of modern Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) to malicious adversarial weight attacks. The well-studied RowHammer attack has effectively compromised DNN performance by inducing precise and deterministic bit-flips in the main memory (e.g., DRAM). Similarly, RowPress has emerged as another effective strategy for flipping targeted bits in DRAM. However, the impact of RowPress on deep learning applications has yet to be explored in the existing literature, leaving a fundamental research question unanswered: How does RowPress compare to RowHammer in leveraging bit-flip attacks to compromise DNN performance? This paper is the first to address this question and evaluate the impact of RowPress on DNN applications. We conduct a comparative analysis utilizing a novel DRAM-profile-aware attack designed to capture the distinct bit-flip patterns caused by RowHammer and RowPress. Eleven widely-used DNN architectures trained on different benchmark datasets deployed on a Samsung DRAM chip conclusively demonstrate that they suffer from a drastically more rapid performance degradation under the RowPress attack compared to RowHammer. The difference in the underlying attack mechanism of RowHammer and RowPress also renders existing RowHammer mitigation mechanisms ineffective under RowPress. As a result, RowPress introduces a new vulnerability paradigm for DNN compute platforms and unveils the urgent need for corresponding protective measures.

This brief studies the impact of escalating DRAM RowHammer (RH) attack distance to potentially bypass well-developed counter-based defenses leveraging a multisided fault injection mechanism. By conducting systematic experimentation on 128 commercial DDR4 products, our results challenge recent research findings, showing that cells positioned at a greater physical distance from the target rows do not significantly affect performance across chips sourced from leading DRAM manufacturers. This implies such RH models are unable to reliably bypass the latest counter-based defense mechanisms. We conduct an extensive attack design space exploration and compare the performance efficiency between this mechanism and the well-known double-sided attack.