VLDB 2026 Research / reviewers in the wild / expert
Mingshi Wu
dblp:353/7580
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
2as first author
3since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 3 · 2 first-author · 3 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | CensorLess: Cost-Efficient Censorship Circumvention Through Serverless Cloud FunctionsabstractWith the increase in Internet censorship globally, various circumvention tools have been designed and developed. However, the monetary cost of these tools deeply impacts both user choice and the sustainability of provider operations. Recent developments in censorship circumvention research attempted to achieve cost efficiency by utilizing Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) spot instances as bridges, but still incurred substantial expenses related to network connectivity and instance maintenance. In this work, we present CensorLess, a circumvention proxy that leverages the unique benefits of serverless platforms. CensorLess comprises three components:a local proxy that manages client communication and enforces serverless security constraints, a function refresher that periodically regenerates bridges, and a live migration mechanism that maintains continuous connectivity. By design, CensorLess inherits key serverless properties, which are cost efficiency, ephemerality, scalability, concurrency, and high performance. Compared to existing low-cost, state-of-the-art circumvention techniques, CensorLess reduces operational costs by 97%, while simultaneously enabling robust censorship resistance by employing bridge rotation. Dayeon Kang, Jade Sheffey, Mingshi Wu, Pubali Datta, Amir Houmansadr |
Proc. Priv. Enhancing Technol. | 3 |
| 2025 | A Wall Behind A Wall: Emerging Regional Censorship in ChinaabstractChina has long orchestrated its Internet censorship through relatively centralized policies and a unified imple-mentation, known as the Great Firewall of China (GFW). However, since August 2023, anecdotes suggest that the Henan Province has deployed its own regional censorship. In this work, we characterize provincial-level censorship in Henan, and compare it with the national-level GFW. We find that Henan has established TLS SNI-based and HTTP Host-based censorship that inspects and blocks traffic leaving the province. While the Henan Firewall is less sophisticated and less robust against typical network variability, its volatile and aggressive blocking of second-level domains made it block ten times more web sites than the GFW at some points in time. Based on the observed parsing flaws and injection behaviors, we introduce simple client-side methods to bypass censorship in the Henan province. Our work documents an alarming sign of regional censorship emerging in China. Mingshi Wu, Ali Zohaib, Zakir Durumeric, Amir Houmansadr, Eric Wustrow |
SP | 1 |
| 2023 | How the Great Firewall of China Detects and Blocks Fully Encrypted Traffic
Mingshi Wu, Jackson Sippe, Danesh Sivakumar, Jack Burg, Kevin Bock 0001, Amir Houmansadr, Dave Levin, Eric Wustrow |
USENIX Security Symposium | 1 |