Red-teaming, or identifying prompts that elicit harmful responses, is a critical step in ensuring the safe and responsible deployment of large language models (LLMs). Developing effective protection against many modes of attack prompts requires discovering diverse attacks. Automated red-teaming typically uses reinforcement learning to fine-tune an attacker language model to generate prompts that elicit undesirable responses from a target LLM, as measured, for example, by an auxiliary toxicity classifier. We show that even with explicit regularization to favor novelty and diversity, existing approaches suffer from mode collapse or fail to generate effective attacks. As a flexible and probabilistically principled alternative, we propose to use GFlowNet fine-tuning, followed by a secondary smoothing phase, to train the attacker model to generate *diverse* and *effective* attack prompts. We find that the attacks generated by our method are effective against a wide range of target LLMs, both with and without safety tuning, and transfer well between target LLMs. Finally, we demonstrate that models safety-tuned using a dataset of red-teaming prompts generated by our method are robust to attacks from other RL-based red-teaming approaches.

Plasticity loss, trainability loss, and primacy bias have been identified as issues arising when training deep neural networks on sequences of tasks---referring to the increased difficulty in training on new tasks. We propose to use Parseval regularization, which maintains orthogonality of weight matrices, to preserve useful optimization properties and improve training in a continual reinforcement learning setting. We show that it provides significant benefits to RL agents on a suite of gridworld, CARL and MetaWorld tasks. We conduct comprehensive ablations to identify the source of its benefits and investigate the effect of certain metrics associated to network trainability including weight matrix rank, weight norms and policy entropy.