The two-factor authentication (2FA) has been increasingly used with the popularity of mobile devices. Currently, many existing 2FA schemes extract the devices’ acoustic fingerprints as the second factor. Nevertheless, they mainly consider deriving fingerprints from the raw acoustic waveforms for authentication, which are susceptible to the fingerprint variations caused by the environmental noise or the varying distance between devices. To address these vulnerabilities, we propose a robust system utilizing the distortions of modulated signals, which are incurred by the acoustic elements of mobile devices, as the proof for 2FA. Specifically, our system first designs a channel delay estimation scheme to accurately estimate the propagation delay from the speaker to the microphone by deriving the phase change of the received sinusoidal signal. To perform a robust authentication, we design a new acoustic fingerprinting scheme to remove the impacts of the varying distance and environmental noise from the demodulated PSK signals for fingerprint extraction. Moreover, our device authentication component designs a transfer learning-based scheme to capture the subtle differences in devices’ fingerprints for accurate device authentication. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 2FA system that could extract acoustic fingerprints in modulation domain and can effectively withstand the impacts of channel distortions. We also confirm the accuracy and security of our system through extensive user experiments.

Optical image stabilization (OIS), powered by a special micro-electromechanical structure in the camera lenses to compensate for the optical distortion caused by camera shakes, has become an indispensable feature in many smartphones. However, we discover that this seemingly benign component can be exploited to eavesdrop on nearby audio signals, posing a significant threat to people's privacy during conversations or phone calls. Specifically, the OIS component can be influenced by external acoustic stimuli leading to slight vibrations, and at the same time, the coil and magnetized components inside the OIS induce electromagnetic leakage as they vibrate, according to Faraday's Law of Electromagnetic Induction. This electro-magnetic leakage contains voice information that can be used to recover the audio signals if intercepted by individuals with malicious intent. Inspired by the above discovery, we propose OISMic, a new acoustic eavesdropping attack that takes advantage of sound-induced OIS vibrations on smartphones. Unlike other existing acoustic eavesdropping attacks, eavesdropping exploiting OIS vibrations not only overcomes the constraints imposed by system permissions for many sensor-based approaches but is also immune to ultrasonic jammer that hinders the methods relying on microwave or light reflections to sense sound-induced vibrations. To execute this non-trivial attack in practical scenarios, we developed a prototype circuit that has a compact design capable of capturing the electromagnetic leakage caused by OIS vibrations. After converting the collected leaked electromagnetic signals into audio signals, a software-based phase-locked loop (PLL) method is developed to enhance the representation of voice components. Meanwhile, to reconstruct the weak audio signals, we also designed a diffusion-based neural network to learn the distribution of electromagnetic noise within the audio spectrum. Extensive experiments indicate that OISMic can accurately reconstruct voice under various scenarios, achieving an average word correct rate of 90.57 % across different devices.

The two-factor authentication (2FA) has become pervasive as the mobile devices become prevalent. Existing 2FA solutions usually require some form of user involvement, which could severely affect user experience and bring extra burdens to users. In this work, we propose a secure 2FA that utilizes the individual acoustic fingerprint of the speaker/microphone on enrolled device as the second proof. The main idea behind our system is to use both magnitude and phase fingerprints derived from the frequency response of the enrolled device by emitting acoustic beep signals alternately from both enrolled and login devices and receiving their direct arrivals for 2FA. Given the input microphone samplings, our system designs an arrival time detection scheme to accurately identify the beginning point of the beep signal from the received signal. To achieve a robust authentication, we develop a new distance mitigation scheme to eliminate the impact of transmission distances from the sound propagation model for extracting stable fingerprint in both magnitude and phase domain. Our device authentication component then calculates a weighted correlation value between the device profile and fingerprints extracted from run-time measurements to conduct the device authentication for 2FA. Moreover, to thwart the possible co-located attacks, our proximity detection component further makes the enrolled phone to generate an active random vibration signal by its built-in motor, and then matches the signal received by the microphone of login device with the signal received by the accelerometer of enrolled phone to verify the proximity of two devices. Our experimental results show that our proposed system is accurate and robust to various attacks across different scenarios and device models.

The two-factor authentication (2FA) has become pervasive as the mobile devices become prevalent. Existing 2FA solutions usually require some form of user involvement, which could severely affect user experience and bring extra burdens to users. In this work, we propose a secure 2FA that utilizes the individual acoustic fingerprint of the speaker/microphone on enrolled device as the second proof. The main idea behind our system is to use both magnitude and phase fingerprints derived from the frequency response of the enrolled device by emitting acoustic beep signals alternately from both enrolled and login devices and receiving their direct arrivals for 2FA. Given the input microphone samplings, our system designs an arrival time detection scheme to accurately identify the beginning point of the beep signal from the received signal. To achieve a robust authentication, we develop a new distance mitigation scheme to eliminate the impact of transmission distances from the sound propagation model for extracting stable fingerprint in both magnitude and phase domain. Our device authentication component then calculates a weighted correlation value between the device profile and fingerprints extracted from run-time measurements to conduct the device authentication for 2FA. Our experimental results show that our proposed system is accurate and robust to both random impersonation and Man-in-the-middle (MiM) attack across different scenarios and device models.