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Christoph Wech

dblp:357/0489 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
3since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0005-9701-8614ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 67% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 33%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Memory systems · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › cryptographic foundations › cryptographic models
chosen-plaintext attack
0.912025
Heracles: Chosen Plaintext Attack on AMD SEV-SNP · CCS 2025
Hardware security and side channels › trusted execution environments
confidential computing
0.912025
Heracles: Chosen Plaintext Attack on AMD SEV-SNP · CCS 2025
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments
0.912025
Heracles: Chosen Plaintext Attack on AMD SEV-SNP · CCS 2025
Memory systems
memory encryption
0.312025
Heracles: Chosen Plaintext Attack on AMD SEV-SNP · CCS 2025
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Heracles: Chosen Plaintext Attack on AMD SEV-SNP
abstract
Confidential computing needs hardware support that stops privileged software from learning secrets of a guest virtual machine. AMD offers such hardware support in the form of SEV-SNP to create confidential virtual machines, such that hardware encrypts all the VM memory. Specifically, SEV-SNP uses the XEX encryption mode with address-dependent tweak values such that the same plaintext at different memory addresses yields different ciphertexts.
Benedict Schlüter, Christoph Wech, Shweta Shinde
CCS2
2024 Combinatorial Testing Methods for Reverse Engineering Undocumented CAN Bus Functionality
abstract
Modern vehicles such as cars, ships, and planes are increasingly managed using Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that communicate over a Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. While this approach offers enhanced functionality, efficiency, and robustness, it may also be used for unforeseen or malicious purposes ranging from aftermarket modifications to full-fledged attacks threatening passengers’ safety. The ability to conduct in-depth tests is thus vital to protect against these issues. However, much of the functionality of ECUs is proprietary or undocumented. To alleviate this obstacle, this work presents a reverse engineering approach using high-coverage test sets produced using Combinatorial Testing (CT) methods. Our results indicate that this technique is promising for exciting unknown functionality, although challenges regarding the presence of hidden state and high-accuracy oracles are yet to be overcome.
Christoph Wech, Reinhard Kugler, Manuel Leithner, Dimitris E. Simos
ARES1
2023 Applying Pairwise Combinatorial Testing to Large Language Model Testing
Bernhard Garn, Ludwig Kampel, Manuel Leithner, Berina Celic, Ceren Çulha, Irene Hiess, Klaus Kieseberg, Marlene Koelbing, Dominik-Philip Schreiber, Michael Wagner 0026, Christoph Wech, Jovan Zivanovic, Dimitris E. Simos
ICTSS11