Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Qijing Li
dblp:361/1472
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
3since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0004-8875-1278ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Computer networks · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Systems and software security · 70% Hardware security and side channels · 30% | |
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper |
Memory systems · 44% Cloud and datacenter computing · 44% Hardware accelerators and domain-specific architectures · 13% |
Topics — the 6 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Memory systems
cache management |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | CEIO: A Cache-Efficient Network I/O Architecture for NIC-CPU Data Paths · SIGCOMM 2025 |
Systems and software security › memory safety › memory isolation
in-process isolation |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | PANIC: PAN-assisted Intra-process Memory Isolation on ARM · CCS 2023 |
Systems and software security › memory safety
memory isolation |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | PANIC: PAN-assisted Intra-process Memory Isolation on ARM · CCS 2023 |
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | PANIC: PAN-assisted Intra-process Memory Isolation on ARM · CCS 2023 |
Hardware accelerators and domain-specific architectures › network accelerator
SmartNIC |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | CEIO: A Cache-Efficient Network I/O Architecture for NIC-CPU Data Paths · SIGCOMM 2025 |
Systems and software security › memory safety
control-flow integrity |
0.2 | 1 | 2023 | PANIC: PAN-assisted Intra-process Memory Isolation on ARM · CCS 2023 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
proactive rate control · 0.9elastic buffering · 0.9shim-based memory isolation · 0.7sensitive instruction emulation · 0.7privileged access never · 0.7load/store unprivileged instructions · 0.7
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Cache-Aware I/O Rate Control for RDMA
Qijing Li, Bowen Liu 0002, Junxue Zhang 0001, Kai Chen 0005 |
APNet | 1 |
| 2025 | CEIO: A Cache-Efficient Network I/O Architecture for NIC-CPU Data PathsabstractEfficient Input/Output (I/O) data path between NICs and CPUs/DRAMs is critical for supporting datacenter applications with high-performance network transmission, especially as link speed scales to 100Gbps and beyond. Traditional I/O acceleration strategies, such as Data Direct I/O (DDIO) and Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA), perform suboptimally due to the inefficient utilization of the Last-Level Cache (LLC). This paper presents CEIO, a novel cache-efficient network I/O architecture that employs proactive rate control and elastic buffering to achieve zero LLC misses in the I/O data path while ensuring the effectiveness of DDIO and RDMA under various network conditions. We have implemented CEIO on commodity SmartNICs and incorporated it into widely-used DPDK and RDMA libraries. Experiments with well-optimized RPC framework and distributed file system under realistic workloads demonstrate that CEIO achieves up to 2.9× higher throughput and 1.9× lower P99.9 latency over prior work. Bowen Liu 0002, Qijing Li, Zhuobin Huang, Yijun Sun, Wenxue Li 0004, Junxue Zhang 0001, Ping Yin, Kai Chen 0005 |
SIGCOMM | 3 |
| 2023 | PANIC: PAN-assisted Intra-process Memory Isolation on ARMabstractIntra-process memory isolation is a well-known technique to enforce least privilege within a process. In this paper, we propose a generic and efficient intra-process memory isolation technique named PANIC, by leveraging Privileged Access Never (PAN) and load/store unprivileged (LSU) instructions on AArch64. PANIC executes process code in kernel mode and compartments code into trusted and untrusted components. The untrusted code is restricted from accessing the isolated memory region, which is located on user pages, and the trusted code is allowed to access the isolated memory region by using LSU instructions. To mitigate threats induced by running user code in kernel mode, PANIC provides two novel security mechanisms: shim-based memory isolation and sensitive instruction emulation. PANIC provides a generic and efficient isolation primitive that can be applied in three different isolation scenarios: protecting sensitive data in CFI, creating isolated execution environments, and hardening JIT code cache. We have implemented a prototype of PANIC and experimental evaluation shows that PANIC incurs very low performance overhead, and performs better than existing methods. Mengyao Xie, Chenggang Wu 0002, Yinqian Zhang, Qijing Li, Yuanming Lai, Yan Kang 0002, Wei Wang 0385, Zhe Wang 0017 |
CCS | 5 |