VLDB 2026 Research / reviewers in the wild / expert
Allison Lu
dblp:361/2134
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
3since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0000-2525-4478ORCID · reported
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 3 · 3 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Data to Infinity and Beyond: Examining Data Sharing and Reuse Practices in the Computer Security CommunityabstractSharing high-quality research data specifically for reuse in future work helps the scientific community progress by enabling researchers to build upon existing work and explore new research questions without duplicating data collection efforts. Because current discussions about research artifacts in Computer Security focus on reproducibility and availability of source code, the reusability of data is unclear. We examine data sharing practices in Computer Security and Measurement to provide resources and recommendations for sharing reusable data. Our study covers five years (2019–2023) and seven conferences in Computer Security and Measurement, identifying 948 papers that create a dataset as one of their contributions. We analyze the 265 accessible datasets, evaluating their under-standability and level of reuse. Our findings reveal inconsistent practices in data sharing structure and documentation, causing some datasets to not be shared effectively. Additionally, reuse of datasets is low, especially in fields where the nature of the data does not lend itself to reuse. Based on our findings, we offer data-driven recommendations and resources for improving data sharing practices in our community. Furthermore, we encourage authors to be intentional about their data sharing goals and align their sharing strategies with those goals. Anna Crowder, Allison Lu, Kevin Childs, Carson Stillman, Patrick Traynor, Kevin R. B. Butler |
SP | 2 |
| 2024 | "Better Be Computer or I'm Dumb": A Large-Scale Evaluation of Humans as Audio Deepfake DetectorsabstractAudio deepfakes represent a rising threat to trust in our daily communications. In response to this, the research community has developed a wide array of detection techniques aimed at preventing such attacks from deceiving users. Unfortunately, the creation of these defenses has generally overlooked the most important element of the system - the user themselves. As such, it is not clear whether current mechanisms augment, hinder, or simply contradict human classification of deepfakes. In this paper, we perform the first large-scale user study on deepfake detection. We recruit over 1,200 users and present them with samples from the three most widely-cited deepfake datasets. We then quantitatively compare performance and qualitatively conduct thematic analysis to motivate and understand the reasoning behind user decisions and differences from machine classifications. Our results show that users correctly classify human audio at significantly higher rates than machine learning models, and rely on linguistic features and intuition when performing classification. However, users are also regularly misled by pre-conceptions about the capabilities of generated audio (e.g., that accents and background sounds are indicative of humans). Finally, machine learning models suffer from significantly higher false positive rates, and experience false negatives that humans correctly classify when issues of quality or robotic characteristics are reported. By analyzing user behavior across multiple deepfake datasets, our study demonstrates the need to more tightly compare user and machine learning performance, and to target the latter towards areas where humans are less likely to successfully identify threats. Kevin Warren, Tyler Tucker, Anna Crowder, Daniel Olszewski, Allison Lu, Caroline Fedele, Magdalena Pasternak, Seth Layton, Kevin R. B. Butler, Carrie Gates, Patrick Traynor |
CCS | 5 |
| 2023 | "Get in Researchers; We're Measuring Reproducibility": A Reproducibility Study of Machine Learning Papers in Tier 1 Security ConferencesabstractReproducibility is crucial to the advancement of science; it strengthens confidence in seemingly contradictory results and expands the boundaries of known discoveries. Computer Security has the natural benefit of creating artifacts that should facilitate computational reproducibility, the ability for others to use someone else's code and data to independently recreate results, in a relatively straightforward fashion. While the Security community has recently increased its attention on reproducibility, an independent and comprehensive measurement of the current state of reproducibility has not been conducted. In this paper, we perform the first such study, targeting reproducible artifacts generated specifically by papers on machine learning security (one of the most popular areas in academic research) published in Tier 1 security conferences over the past ten years (2013-2022). We perform our measurement study of indirect and direct reproducibility over nearly 750 papers, their codebases, and datasets. Our analysis shows that there is no statistically significant difference between the availability of artifacts before and after the introduction of Artifact Evaluation Committees in Tier 1 conferences. However, based on three years of results, artifacts that pass through this process work at a higher rate than those that do not. From our collected findings, we offer data-driven suggestions for improving reproducibility in our community, including five common problems observed in our study. In so doing, we demonstrate that significant progress still needs to be made in computational reproducibility in Computer Security research. Daniel Olszewski, Allison Lu, Carson Stillman, Kevin Warren, Cole Kitroser, Alejandro Pascual, Divyajyoti Ukirde, Kevin R. B. Butler, Patrick Traynor |
CCS | 2 |