Kyung Myung Ko

dblp:367/4985 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 100%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Empirical software engineering · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security › software supply chain security
software signing
0.812024
Signing in Four Public Software Package Registries: Quantity, Quality, and Influencing Factors · SP 2024
Systems and software security
software supply chain security
0.812024
Signing in Four Public Software Package Registries: Quantity, Quality, and Influencing Factors · SP 2024
Empirical software engineering
mining software repositories
0.212024
Signing in Four Public Software Package Registries: Quantity, Quality, and Influencing Factors · SP 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

quasi-experiment · 1.5longitudinal measurement · 1.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Signing in Four Public Software Package Registries: Quantity, Quality, and Influencing Factors
abstract
Many software applications incorporate open-source third-party packages distributed by public package registries. Guaranteeing authorship along this supply chain is a challenge. Package maintainers can guarantee package authorship through software signing. However, it is unclear how common this practice is, and whether the resulting signatures are created properly. Prior work has provided raw data on registry signing practices, but only measured single platforms, did not consider quality, did not consider time, and did not assess factors that may influence signing. We do not have up-to-date measurements of signing practices nor do we know the quality of existing signatures. Furthermore, we lack a comprehensive understanding of factors that influence signing adoption.This study addresses this gap. We provide measurements across three kinds of package registries: traditional software (Maven, PyPI), container images (Docker Hub), and machine learning models (Hugging Face). For each registry, we describe the nature of the signed artifacts as well as the current quantity and quality of signatures. Then, we examine longitudinal trends in signing practices. Finally, we use a quasi-experiment to estimate the effect that various factors had on software signing practices. To summarize our findings: (1) mandating signature adoption improves the quantity of signatures; (2) providing dedicated tooling improves the quality of signing; (3) getting started is the hard part — once a maintainer begins to sign, they tend to continue doing so; and (4) although many supply chain attacks are mitigable via signing, signing adoption is primarily affected by registry policy rather than by public knowledge of attacks, new engineering standards, etc. These findings highlight the importance of software package registry managers and signing infrastructure.
Taylor R. Schorlemmer, Kelechi G. Kalu, Luke Chigges, Kyung Myung Ko, Eman Abu Ishgair, Saurabh Bagchi, Santiago Torres-Arias, James C. Davis 0001
SP4