VLDB 2026 Research / reviewers in the wild / expert
Kyung Myung Ko
dblp:367/4985
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Systems and software security · 100% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Empirical software engineering · 100% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Systems and software security › software supply chain security
software signing |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Signing in Four Public Software Package Registries: Quantity, Quality, and Influencing Factors · SP 2024 |
Systems and software security
software supply chain security |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Signing in Four Public Software Package Registries: Quantity, Quality, and Influencing Factors · SP 2024 |
Empirical software engineering
mining software repositories |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Signing in Four Public Software Package Registries: Quantity, Quality, and Influencing Factors · SP 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
quasi-experiment · 1.5longitudinal measurement · 1.5
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Signing in Four Public Software Package Registries: Quantity, Quality, and Influencing FactorsabstractMany software applications incorporate open-source third-party packages distributed by public package registries. Guaranteeing authorship along this supply chain is a challenge. Package maintainers can guarantee package authorship through software signing. However, it is unclear how common this practice is, and whether the resulting signatures are created properly. Prior work has provided raw data on registry signing practices, but only measured single platforms, did not consider quality, did not consider time, and did not assess factors that may influence signing. We do not have up-to-date measurements of signing practices nor do we know the quality of existing signatures. Furthermore, we lack a comprehensive understanding of factors that influence signing adoption.This study addresses this gap. We provide measurements across three kinds of package registries: traditional software (Maven, PyPI), container images (Docker Hub), and machine learning models (Hugging Face). For each registry, we describe the nature of the signed artifacts as well as the current quantity and quality of signatures. Then, we examine longitudinal trends in signing practices. Finally, we use a quasi-experiment to estimate the effect that various factors had on software signing practices. To summarize our findings: (1) mandating signature adoption improves the quantity of signatures; (2) providing dedicated tooling improves the quality of signing; (3) getting started is the hard part — once a maintainer begins to sign, they tend to continue doing so; and (4) although many supply chain attacks are mitigable via signing, signing adoption is primarily affected by registry policy rather than by public knowledge of attacks, new engineering standards, etc. These findings highlight the importance of software package registry managers and signing infrastructure. Taylor R. Schorlemmer, Kelechi G. Kalu, Luke Chigges, Kyung Myung Ko, Eman Abu Ishgair, Saurabh Bagchi, Santiago Torres-Arias, James C. Davis 0001 |
SP | 4 |