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Reid Southen

dblp:367/9391 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
0009-0001-4296-986XORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
2 papers
Trustworthy machine learning · 100%
Network and information security
1 paper
Usable security · 100%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › adversarial machine learning › adversarial defense
adversarial example detection
0.812024
Organic or Diffused: Can We Distinguish Human Art from AI-generated Images? · CCS 2024
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › AI-generated content detection
AI-generated image detection
0.812024
Organic or Diffused: Can We Distinguish Human Art from AI-generated Images? · CCS 2024
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
AI governance
0.812024
Position: A Safe Harbor for AI Evaluation and Red Teaming · ICML 2024
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › safety evaluation
red teaming
0.812024
Position: A Safe Harbor for AI Evaluation and Red Teaming · ICML 2024
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness
0.812024
Organic or Diffused: Can We Distinguish Human Art from AI-generated Images? · CCS 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

supervised classifier · 1.5human study · 1.5adversarial perturbation · 1.5policy analysis · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Organic or Diffused: Can We Distinguish Human Art from AI-generated Images?
abstract
The advent of generative AI images has completely disrupted the art world. Distinguishing AI generated images from human art is a challenging problem whose impact is growing over time. A failure to address this problem allows bad actors to defraud individuals paying a premium for human art and companies whose stated policies forbid AI imagery. It is also critical for content owners to establish copyright, and for model trainers interested in curating training data in order to avoid potential model collapse. There are several different approaches to distinguishing human art from AI images, including classifiers trained by supervised learning, research tools targeting diffusion models, and identification by professional artists using their knowledge of artistic techniques. In this paper, we seek to understand how well these approaches can perform against today's modern generative models in both benign and adversarial settings. We curate real human art across 7 styles, generate matching images from 5 generative models, and apply 8 detectors (5 automated detectors and 3 different human groups including 180 crowdworkers, 3800+ professional artists, and 13 expert artists experienced at detecting AI). Both Hive and expert artists do very well, but make mistakes in different ways (Hive is weaker against adversarial perturbations while Expert artists produce higher false positives). We believe these weaknesses will persist, and argue that a combination of human and automated detectors provides the best combination of accuracy and robustness.
Anna Yoo Jeong Ha, Josephine Passananti, Ronik Bhaskar, Shawn Shan, Reid Southen, Haitao Zheng 0001, Ben Y. Zhao
CCS5
2024 Position: A Safe Harbor for AI Evaluation and Red Teaming
abstract
Independent evaluation and red teaming are critical for identifying the risks posed by generative AI systems. However, the terms of service and enforcement strategies used by prominent AI companies to deter model misuse have disincentives on good faith safety evaluations. This causes some researchers to fear that conducting such research or releasing their findings will result in account suspensions or legal reprisal. Although some companies offer researcher access programs, they are an inadequate substitute for independent research access, as they have limited community representation, receive inadequate funding, and lack independence from corporate incentives. We propose that major generative AI developers commit to providing a legal and technical safe harbor, protecting public interest safety research and removing the threat of account suspensions or legal reprisal. These proposals emerged from our collective experience conducting safety, privacy, and trustworthiness research on generative AI systems, where norms and incentives could be better aligned with public interests, without exacerbating model misuse. We believe these commitments are a necessary step towards more inclusive and unimpeded community efforts to tackle the risks of generative AI.
Shayne Longpre, Sayash Kapoor, Kevin Klyman, Ashwin Ramaswami, Rishi Bommasani, Borhane Blili-Hamelin, Yangsibo Huang, Aviya Skowron, Suhas Kotha, Yi Zeng 0005, Weiyan Shi 0001, Xianjun Yang, Reid Southen, Alexander Robey, Patrick Chao, Diyi Yang, Ruoxi Jia 0001, Daniel Kang 0001, Alex Pentland, Arvind Narayanan, Percy Liang, Peter Henderson 0002
ICML14