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Mahantesh Hosamani

dblp:37/3874 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2008
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 100%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Services computing and microservices · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Hardware security and side channels › hardware security primitives
hardware root of trust
0.112008
Tisa: Toward Trustworthy Services in a Service-Oriented Architecture · IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput. 2008
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments
0.112008
Tisa: Toward Trustworthy Services in a Service-Oriented Architecture · IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput. 2008
Services computing and microservices
service-oriented architecture
0.112008
Tisa: Toward Trustworthy Services in a Service-Oriented Architecture · IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput. 2008

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

integrity verification · 0.2hardware root of trust · 0.2
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2008 Tisa: Toward Trustworthy Services in a Service-Oriented Architecture
abstract
Verifying whether a service implementation is conforming to its service-level agreements is important to inspire confidence in services in a service-oriented architecture (SoA). Functional agreements can be checked by observing the published interface of the service, but other agreements that are more non-functional in nature, are often verified by deploying a monitor that observes the execution of the service implementation. A problem is that such a monitor must execute in an untrusted environment. Thus, integrity of the results reported by such a monitor crucially depends on its integrity. We contribute an extension of the traditional SoA, based on hardware-based root of trust, that allows clients, brokers and providers to negotiate and validate the integrity of a requirements monitor executing in an untrusted environment. We make two basic claims: first, that it is feasible to realize our approach using existing hardware and software solutions, and second, that integrity verification can be done at a relatively small overhead. To evaluate feasibility, we have realized our approach using current software and hardware solutions. To measure overhead, we have conducted a case study using a collection of Web service implementations available with Apache Axis implementation.
Hridesh Rajan, Mahantesh Hosamani
IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput.2