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Xiongjie Zhu

dblp:375/7255 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0002-2269-7924ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Network security · 67% Digital forensics and information hiding · 33%
Computer networks
1 paper
Network management and operations · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network security › intrusion detection and prevention › intrusion detection › attack detection
advanced persistent threat detection
0.812024
T-Trace: Constructing the APTs Provenance Graphs Through Multiple Syslogs Correlation · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2024
Digital forensics and information hiding › digital forensics
forensic analysis
0.812024
T-Trace: Constructing the APTs Provenance Graphs Through Multiple Syslogs Correlation · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2024
Network security › intrusion detection and prevention
intrusion detection
0.812024
T-Trace: Constructing the APTs Provenance Graphs Through Multiple Syslogs Correlation · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2024
Network management and operations
log analysis
0.212024
T-Trace: Constructing the APTs Provenance Graphs Through Multiple Syslogs Correlation · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

tensor decomposition · 1.5log correlation · 1.5community detection · 1.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 T-Trace: Constructing the APTs Provenance Graphs Through Multiple Syslogs Correlation
abstract
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) employ sophisticated and covert tactics to infiltrate target systems, leading to increased vulnerability and an elevated risk of exposure. Consequently, it is essential for us to proactively create an extensive and clearly outlined attack chain for APTs in order to effectively combat these threats. Unlike traditional malware or application threats, APTs can sidestep cyber security efforts and cause severe damage to organizations or even state security. Nonetheless, earlier methods struggle to accurately track APTs and may face a dependency explosion issue, as identifying the intricate and complex unknown malicious activities within APTs proves to be challenging. In this paper, we propose and build an approach, T-trace, which constructs the events provenance graphs by analyzing the correlations among logs. The approach precisely finds the log communities with tensor decomposition and calculates significance scores to extract the events. The APTs can be inferred by discovering the event communities and constructing the provenance graph with log correlation. In the experiment, we used DARPA data sets and launched four current practical APTs. Compared with current approaches, the results show that T-trace can efficiently reduce time cost by 90% and achieve a 92% accuracy rate in constructing the provenance graph, which can be practically applied in APTs provenance.
Teng Li 0003, Ximeng Liu, Wei Qiao 0005, Xiongjie Zhu, Yulong Shen 0001, Jianfeng Ma 0001
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput.4