We study Löwenheim-Skolem and Omitting Types theorems in Transition Algebra, a logical system obtained by enhancing many sorted first-order logic with features from dynamic logic. The sentences we consider include compositions, unions, and transitive closures of transition relations, which are treated similarly to actions in dynamic logics to define necessity and possibility operators. We show that Upward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, any form of compactness, and joint Robinson consistency property fail due to the expressivity of transitive closures of transitions. In this non-compact many-sorted logical system, we develop a forcing technique method by generalizing the classical method of forcing used by Keisler to prove Omitting Types theorem. Instead of working within a single signature, we work with a directed diagram of signatures, which allows us to establish Downward Löwenheim-Skolem and Omitting Types theorems despite the fact that models interpret sorts as sets, possibly empty. Building on a complete system of proof rules for Transition Algebra, we extend it with additional proof rules to reason about constructor-based and/or finite transition algebras. We then establish the completeness of this extended system for a fragment of Transition Algebra obtained by restricting models to constructor-based and/or finite transition algebras.

We bring forward a logical system of transition algebras that enhances many-sorted first-order logic using features from dynamic logics. The sentences we consider include compositions, unions, and transitive closures of transition relations, which are treated similarly to the actions used in dynamic logics in order to define necessity and possibility operators. This leads to a higher degree of expressivity than that of many-sorted first-order logic. For example, one can finitely axiomatize both the finiteness and the reachability of models, neither of which are ordinarily possible in many-sorted first-order logic. We introduce syntactic entailment and study basic properties such as compactness and completeness, showing that the latter does not hold when standard finitary proof rules are used. Consequently, we define proof rules having both finite and countably infinite premises, and we provide conditions under which completeness can be proved. To that end, we generalize the forcing method introduced in model theory by Robinson from a single signature to a category of signatures, and we apply it to obtain a completeness result for signatures that are at most countable.