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Ravindar Narayan

dblp:38/3640 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2001
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Computer networks · 4

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Network security · 87% Systems and software security · 13%
Computer networks
1 paper
Routing and switching · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Routing and switching › routing protocol
link-state routing
0.011998
Statistical Anomaly Detection for Link-State Routing Protocols · ICNP 1998
Network security › intrusion detection and prevention
intrusion detection
0.011998
Statistical Anomaly Detection for Link-State Routing Protocols · ICNP 1998
Network security › intrusion detection and prevention › intrusion detection › anomaly detection
statistical anomaly detection
0.011998
Statistical Anomaly Detection for Link-State Routing Protocols · ICNP 1998
Systems and software security › insider threat › insider threat detection
insider attack detection
0.011998
Statistical Anomaly Detection for Link-State Routing Protocols · ICNP 1998

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

statistical intrusion detection · 0.0NIDES/STAT · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2001 IPSec/PHIL (packet header information list): design, implementation, and evaluation
abstract
For most TCP/UDP/IP applications, when a packet or a message arrives, usually only the payload portion of the original packet can be obtained by the application. For instance, if a packet has been delivered through some IPSec (IP security) tunnels along the route path, then the application, in general, does not know exactly which tunnels have been used to deliver this particular packet. The IPSec/PHIL (packet header information list) interface has been designed and implemented such that an "authorized" application is able to know which set of IPSec tunnels has been used to deliver a particular incoming packet. Furthermore, IPSec/PHIL enables controllability over which set of IPSec tunnels is used to send a particular outgoing packet. IPSec/PHIL is a key component in the Deciduous decentralized source tracing system to correlate the IPSec information with intrusion detection results. Other IPSec/PHIL applications we have built include a SNMPv3 security module using IPSec as well as an IPSec tunnel switching router.
Chien-Lung Wu, Shyhtsun Felix Wu, Ravindar Narayan
ICCCN3
1999 Intrusion detection for link state routing protocol through integrated network management
abstract
The JiNao IDS project focuses on detecting intrusions, especially insider attacks against link state routing protocols such as OSPF. One important feature of the JiNao system is its integrated network management (INM) capability. Through SNMP and distributed programming interface (DPI), we can manage and control distributed JiNao IDS remotely, interoperate with other JiNao systems to do correlation analysis, and utilize both private MIB and OSPF MIB as a complementary way of doing intrusion detection. This paper describes the design and implementation of JiNao's INM architecture. Three OSPF insider attacks (maxseq, maxage, and seq++) have been developed to evaluate its effectiveness and detection capability.
Feiyi Wang, Fengmin Gong, Shyhtsun Felix Wu, Ravindar Narayan
ICCCN4
1999 DecIdUouS: Decentralized Source Identification for Network-Based Intrusions
abstract
DECIDUOUS is a security management framework for identifying the sources of network-based intrusions. The first key concept in DECIDUOUS is dynamic security associations, which efficiently and collectively provide location information for attack sources. DECIDUOUS is built on top of the IETF's IPSEC/ISAKMP infrastructure, and it does not introduce any new network protocol for source identification in a single administrative domain. It defines a collaborative protocol for inter-domain attack source identification. The second key concept in DECIDUOUS is the management information integration of the intrusion detection system (IDS) and attack source identification system (ASIS) across different protocol layers. For example, in DECIDUOUS, it is possible for a network-layer security control protocol (e.g., IPSEC) to collaborate with an application-layer intrusion detection system module (e.g., IDS for the SNMP engine). In this paper, we present the motivations, design, and prototype implementation of the DECIDUOUS framework.
Ho-Yen Chang, Ravindar Narayan, Shyhtsun Felix Wu, Brian Vetter, Xinyuan Wang 0005, Jim Yuill, Chandramouli Sargor, Y. Frank Jou, Fengmin Gong
Integrated Network Management2
1998 Statistical Anomaly Detection for Link-State Routing Protocols
abstract
The JiNao project at MCNC/NCSU focuses on detecting intrusions, especially insider attacks, against the OSPF (open shortest path first) routing protocol. This paper presents the implementation and experiments of JiNao's statistical intrusion detection module. Our implementation is based upon the algorithm developed in SRI's NIDES (next-generation intrusion detection expert system) project. Some modifications and improvements to NIDES/STAT are made for a more effective implementation in our environment. Also, three OSPF insider attacks (e.g., maxseq, maxage, and seq++ attacks) have been developed for evaluating the efficacy of detecting capability. The experiments were conducted on two different network routing testbeds. The results indicate that the proposed statistical mechanism is very effective in detecting these routing protocol attacks.
Diheng Qu, Brian Vetter, Feiyi Wang, Ravindar Narayan, Shyhtsun Felix Wu, Y. Frank Jou, Fengmin Gong, Chandramouli Sargor
ICNP4