Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Max Wipfli
dblp:381/1641
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
3since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 2 · 2 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
2 papers |
Memory systems · 100% | |
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Hardware security and side channels · 100% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Hardware security and side channels › fault attacks › fault injection attack
rowhammer attack |
1.6 | 2 | 2025 | McSee: Evaluating Advanced Rowhammer Attacks and Defenses via Automated DRAM Traffic Analysis · USENIX Security Symposium 2025 ZenHammer: Rowhammer Attacks on AMD Zen-based Platforms · USENIX Security Symposium 2024 |
Memory systems
DRAM |
1.6 | 2 | 2025 | McSee: Evaluating Advanced Rowhammer Attacks and Defenses via Automated DRAM Traffic Analysis · USENIX Security Symposium 2025 ZenHammer: Rowhammer Attacks on AMD Zen-based Platforms · USENIX Security Symposium 2024 |
Memory systems › DRAM › rowhammer
rowhammer mitigation |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | McSee: Evaluating Advanced Rowhammer Attacks and Defenses via Automated DRAM Traffic Analysis · USENIX Security Symposium 2025 |
Memory systems › DRAM
rowhammer |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | ZenHammer: Rowhammer Attacks on AMD Zen-based Platforms · USENIX Security Symposium 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
automated traffic analysis · 1.7DRAM access pattern analysis · 1.5
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Vmxdotp: A RISC-V Vector ISA Extension for Efficient Microscaling (MX) Format AccelerationabstractCompared to the first generation of deep neural networks, dominated by regular, compute-intensive kernels such as matrix multiplications (MatMuls) and convolutions, modern decoder-based transformers interleave attention, normalization, and data-dependent control flow. This demands flexible accelerators, a requirement met by scalable, highly energy-efficient shared-L1-memory vector processing element (VPE) clusters. Meanwhile, the ever-growing size and bandwidth needs of state-of-the-art models make reduced-precision formats increasingly attractive. Microscaling (MX) data formats, based on block floating-point (BFP) representations, have emerged as a promising solution to reduce data volumes while preserving accuracy. However, MX semantics are poorly aligned with vector execution: block scaling and multi-step mixed-precision operations break the regularity of vector pipelines, leading to underutilized compute resources and performance degradation. To address these challenges, we propose VMXDOTP, a RISC-V Vector (RVV) 1.0 instruction set architecture (ISA) extension for efficient MX dot product execution, supporting MXFP8 and MXFP4 inputs, FP32 and BF16 accumulation, and software-defined block sizes. A Vmxdotp-enhanced VPE cluster achieves up to 97 % utilization on MX-MatMul. Implemented in 12 nm FinFET, it achieves up to 125 MXFP8-GFLOPS and 250 MXFP4-GFLOPS, with 843/1632 MXFP8/MXFP4-GFLOPS/W at 1 GHz, 0.8 V, and only 7.2 % area overhead. Our design yields up to 7.0× speedup and 4.9× energy efficiency with respect to software-emulated MXFP8-MatMul. Compared with prior MX engines, VMXDOTP supports variable block sizes, is up to 1.4× more area-efficient, and delivers up to 2.1× higher energy efficiency. Max Wipfli, Gamze Islamoglu, Navaneeth Kunhi Purayil, Angelo Garofalo, Luca Benini |
DATE | 1 |
| 2025 | McSee: Evaluating Advanced Rowhammer Attacks and Defenses via Automated DRAM Traffic Analysis
Patrick Jattke, Michele Marazzi, Flavien Solt, Max Wipfli, Stefan Gloor, Kaveh Razavi |
USENIX Security Symposium | 4 |
| 2024 | ZenHammer: Rowhammer Attacks on AMD Zen-based Platforms
Patrick Jattke, Max Wipfli, Flavien Solt, Michele Marazzi, Matej Bölcskei, Kaveh Razavi |
USENIX Security Symposium | 2 |