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Matilde Tullii

dblp:381/5025 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
2as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 75% Approximation and online algorithms · 25%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › dynamic pricing
contextual dynamic pricing
0.812024
Improved Algorithms for Contextual Dynamic Pricing · NeurIPS 2024
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
dynamic pricing
0.812024
Improved Algorithms for Contextual Dynamic Pricing · NeurIPS 2024
Approximation and online algorithms
online learning
0.812024
Improved Algorithms for Contextual Dynamic Pricing · NeurIPS 2024
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
regret minimization
0.812024
Improved Algorithms for Contextual Dynamic Pricing · NeurIPS 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

regret analysis · 0.8online learning · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Improved Algorithms for Contextual Dynamic Pricing
abstract
In contextual dynamic pricing, a seller sequentially prices goods based on contextual information. Buyers will purchase products only if the prices are below their valuations. The goal of the seller is to design a pricing strategy that collects as much revenue as possible. We focus on two different valuation models. The first assumes that valuations linearly depend on the context and are further distorted by noise. Under minor regularity assumptions, our algorithm achieves an optimal regret bound of $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3})$, improving the existing results. The second model removes the linearity assumption, requiring only that the expected buyer valuation is $\beta$-H\"older in the context. For this model, our algorithm obtains a regret $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{d+2\beta/d+3\beta})$, where $d$ is the dimension of the context space.
Matilde Tullii, Solenne Gaucher, Nadav Merlis, Vianney Perchet
NeurIPS1
2024 Open Research Challenges for Private Advertising Systems Under Local Differential Privacy
Matilde Tullii, Solenne Gaucher, Hugo Richard, Eustache Diemert, Vianney Perchet, Alain Rakotomamonjy, Clément Calauzènes, Maxime Vono
WISE (5)1