Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) promises information-theoretic security, yet integrating QKD into existing protocols like TLS remains challenging due to its fundamentally different operational model. In this paper, we propose a hybrid QKD-KEM protocol with two distinct integration approaches: a client-initiated flow compatible with both ETSI 004 and 014 specifications, and a server-initiated flow similar to existing work but limited to stateless ETSI 014 APIs. Unlike previous implementations, our work specifically addresses the integration of stateful QKD key exchange protocols (ETSI 004) which is essential for production QKD networks but has remained largely unexplored. By adapting OpenSSL’s provider infrastructure to accommodate QKD’s pre-distributed key model, we maintain compatibility with current TLS implementations while offering dual layers of security. Performance evaluations demonstrate the feasibility of our hybrid scheme with acceptable overhead, showing that robust security against quantum threats is achievable while addressing the unique requirements of different QKD API specifications.

The advance of quantum computing poses a significant threat to classical cryptography, compromising the security of current encryption schemes such as RSA and ECC. In response to this challenge, two main approaches have emerged: quantum cryptography and post-quantum cryptography (PQC). However, both have implementation and security limitations. In this paper, we propose a secure key distribution protocol for Quantum Key Distribution Networks (QKDN), which incorporates encapsulation techniques in the key-relay model for QKDN inspired by onion routing and combined with PQC to guarantee confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and anonymity in communication. The proposed protocol optimizes security by using post-quantum public key encryption to protect the shared secrets from intermediate nodes in the QKDN, thereby reducing the risk of attacks by malicious intermediaries. Finally, relevant use cases are presented, such as critical infrastructure networks, interconnection of data centers and digital money, demonstrating the applicability of the proposal in critical highsecurity environments.

The emergence of quantum computers poses a significant threat to current secure service, application and/or protocol implementations that rely on RSA and ECDSA algorithms, for instance DNSSEC, because public-key cryptography based on number factorization or discrete logarithm is vulnerable to quantum attacks. This paper presents the integration of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms into CoreDNS to enable quantum-resistant DNSSEC functionality for the first time. We have developed a plugin that extends CoreDNS with support for five PQC signature algorithm families: ML-DSA, FALCON, SPHINCS+, MAYO, and SNOVA. Our implementation maintains compatibility with existing DNS resolution flows while providing on-the-fly signing using quantum-resistant signatures. A benchmark has been performed and performance evaluation results reveal significant trade-offs between security and efficiency. The results indicate that while PQC algorithms introduce operational overhead, several candidates offer viable compromises for transitioning DNSSEC to quantum-resistant cryptography.

Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is a practical and cost-effective solution to defend against emerging quantum computing threats. So, leading worldwide security agencies and standardization bodies strongly advocate for the proactive integration of PQ cryptography into underlying frameworks to support applications, protocols, and services. The current research predominantly addresses the incorporation of PQC in Internet communication protocols such as HTTP and DNS; nevertheless, the focus on embedded devices has been limited to evaluating PQC’s integration within TLS/DTLS in isolation. Hence, there is a notable gap in understanding how PQC impacts IoT-specific communication protocols. This paper presents the integration of PQC into two communication protocols specifically tailored for IoT devices, the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) and MQTT for Sensor Networks (MQTT-SN), via the wolfSSL library. These two integrations contribute to the understanding of PQC’s implications for IoT communication protocols.

The rapid advancement of quantum computing poses a significant threat to conventional cryptography. Whilst post-quantum cryptography (PQC) stands as the prevailing trend for fortifying the security of cryptographic systems, the coexistence of quantum and classical computing paradigms presents an opportunity to leverage the strengths of both technologies, for instance, nowadays the use of Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNGs) – considered as True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) – opens up the possibility of discussing hybrid systems. In this paper, we evaluate both aspects, on the one hand, we use hybrid TLS (Transport Layer Security) protocol that leverages the widely used secure protocol on the Internet and integrates PQC algorithms, and, on the other hand, we evaluate two approaches to integrate a QRNG, i.e., Quantis PCIe-240M, in OpenSSL 3.0 to be used by TLS. Both approaches are compared through a Nginx Web server, that uses OpenSSL’s implementation of TLS 1.3 for secure web communication. Our findings highlight the importance of optimizing such integration method, because while direct integration can lead to performance penalties specific to the method and hardware used, alternative methods demonstrate the potential for efficient QRNG deployment in cryptographic systems.