Smart environments are increasingly equipped with interconnected digital systems to manage access and physical security. However, traditional authentication methods, typically restricted to static checkpoints, fail to provide persistent assurance once entry is granted, leaving facilities vulnerable to credential misuse, tailgating, and unauthorised movement. This paper presents the Continuous Authentication Platform (CAP), a modular, multi-modal framework developed within the RAAISE project to enable continuous and context-aware verification across dynamic facility zones. CAP integrates heterogeneous off-the-shelf sensors, including NFC, RFID, biometric, motion, and WiFi positioning units, which collectively support persistent user tracking and real-time access enforcement. The platform’s architecture couples distributed sensing and edge processing with a centralised intelligence layer for event correlation and policy-driven decision-making. A live testbed deployment at Deakin University was used to evaluate CAP’s performance under realistic operational conditions. Results from functional trials demonstrate CAP’s ability to detect credential misuse, prevent tailgating, and maintain authentication continuity with sub-second responsiveness. These findings underscore CAP’s potential as a scalable, privacy-aligned foundation for next-generation smart facility security systems.

Implementing strong authentication methods in a network requires stable connectivity between the service providers deployed within the network (i.e., applications that users of the network need to access) and the Identity and Access Management (IAM) server located at the core segment of the network. This becomes challenging when it comes to Operational Technology (OT) systems deployed in a remote area, as they often get disconnected from the core segment of the network owing to unavoidable network disruptions. As a result, weak authentication methods and shared credential approaches are still adopted in these OT environments, exposing system vulnerabilities to increasingly sophisticated cyber threats. In this work, we propose a solution to enable highly available multi-factor authentication (MFA) services for OT environments. The proposed solution is based on Proof-of-Possession (PoP) tokens generated by an IAM server for registered users. The tokens are securely linked to user-specific parameters (e.g., physical security keys, biometrics, PIN, etc.), enabling strong user authentication (during disconnection time) through token validation. We deployed the Tamarin Prover software-based toolkit to verify security of the proposed authentication scheme. For performance evaluation, we implemented the designed solution in real-world settings. The results of our analysis and experiments confirm the efficacy of the proposed solution.

As the integration of digital technologies with Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and Operational Technology (OT) continues to deepen, these systems increasingly become targets for sophisticated cyber attacks. These attacks not only threaten the operational integrity but also pose significant risks to national security and public safety. In this paper, we provide insights into the value of ICS/OT security solutions that are based on Identity and Access Management (IAM). Beginning with presenting an abstraction model for typical ICS/OT attacks, the paper systematically outlines the main stages of an attack and the corresponding vectors employed by adversaries. Drawing from the MITRE ATT&CK framework tailored for ICS, the paper quantifies the extent to which IAM-based mitigation approaches can strengthen defense-in-depth mechanisms against cyber threats targeting ICS/OT environments. Our findings show that there are modern attack vectors that can only be mitigated through robust IAM solutions. Moreover, we found that while advanced techniques such as firewall and gateway-based intelligent threat detection play a significant role in safeguarding I CS/OT, they are insufficient on their own to address several attack vectors in ICS/OT environments.