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Zedian Shao

dblp:381/7066 · DBLP profile ↗
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6ranked-venue papers
2as first author
6since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0000-6022-8654ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 1 first-author · 3 since 2021Security and privacy · 2 · 2 since 2021Computer networks · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
3 papers
Security and privacy of machine learning · 65% Privacy and data protection · 35%
Artificial intelligence
3 papers
Autonomous driving · 32% Representation and self-supervised learning · 32% Language models and text generation · 24%

Topics — the 9 heaviest of 10, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack
1.922026
Leave My Images Alone: Preventing Multi-Modal Large Language Models from Analyzing Images via Visual Prompt Injection · ACL (1) 2026
WebInject: Prompt Injection Attack to Web Agents · EMNLP 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning
prompt injection
1.922026
PromptLocate: Localizing Prompt Injection Attacks · SP 2026
WebInject: Prompt Injection Attack to Web Agents · EMNLP 2025
Privacy and data protection
image privacy
1.012026
Leave My Images Alone: Preventing Multi-Modal Large Language Models from Analyzing Images via Visual Prompt Injection · ACL (1) 2026
Privacy and data protection › statistical database privacy
perturbation-based protection
1.012026
Leave My Images Alone: Preventing Multi-Modal Large Language Models from Analyzing Images via Visual Prompt Injection · ACL (1) 2026
Robotics › Autonomous driving
collaborative perception
0.812024
Align Before Collaborate: Mitigating Feature Misalignment for Robust Multi-agent Perception · ECCV (4) 2024
Machine learning › Representation and self-supervised learning › representation matching
feature alignment
0.812024
Align Before Collaborate: Mitigating Feature Misalignment for Robust Multi-agent Perception · ECCV (4) 2024
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation › trustworthy language model
large language model security
0.312026
PromptLocate: Localizing Prompt Injection Attacks · SP 2026
Computer vision › Vision and language › vision-language model
multimodal large language model
0.312025
WebInject: Prompt Injection Attack to Web Agents · EMNLP 2025
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation › LLM agents
web agents
0.312025
WebInject: Prompt Injection Attack to Web Agents · EMNLP 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

semantic segmentation · 2.0attack detection · 2.0projected gradient descent · 1.7neural network approximation of non-differentiable mapping · 1.7prompt injection · 1.0adversarial perturbation · 1.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Leave My Images Alone: Preventing Multi-Modal Large Language Models from Analyzing Images via Visual Prompt Injection
abstract
Multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) have emerged as powerful tools for analyzing Internet-scale image data, offering significant benefits but also raising critical safety and societal concerns.In particular, open-weight MLLMs may be misused to extract sensitive information from personal images at scale, such as identities, locations, or other private details.In this work, we propose ImageProtector, a user-side method that proactively protects images before sharing by embedding a carefully crafted, nearly imperceptible perturbation that acts as a visual prompt injection attack on MLLMs.As a result, when an adversary analyzes a protected image with an MLLM, the MLLM is consistently induced to generate a refusal response such as "I'm sorry, I can't help with that request."We empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of ImageProtector across six MLLMs and four datasets.Additionally, we evaluate three potential countermeasures, Gaussian noise, DiffPure, and adversarial training, and show that while they partially mitigate the impact of ImageProtector, they simultaneously degrade model accuracy and/or efficiency.Our study focuses on the practically important setting of open-weight MLLMs and large-scale automated image analysis, and highlights both the promise and the limitations of perturbation-based privacy protection.
Zedian Shao, Hongbin Liu 0005, Yuepeng Hu, Neil Zhenqiang Gong
ACL (1)1
2026 A Critical Evaluation of Defenses against Prompt Injection Attacks: [Dataset/Tool Paper]
abstract
Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, and several defenses have recently been proposed, often claiming to mitigate these attacks successfully. However, we argue that existing studies lack a principled approach to evaluating these defenses. In this paper, we argue the need to assess defenses across two critical dimensions: (1) effectiveness, measured against both existing and adaptive prompt injection attacks involving diverse target and injected prompts, and (2) general-purpose utility, ensuring that the defense does not compromise the foundational capabilities of the LLM. Our critical evaluation reveals that prior studies have not followed such a comprehensive evaluation methodology. When assessed using this principled approach, we show that existing defenses are not as successful as previously reported. This work provides a foundation for evaluating future defenses and guiding their development. Our anonymous code and data are available at https://github.com/PIEval123/PIEval.
Yuqi Jia 0001, Zedian Shao, Yupei Liu, Jinyuan Jia 0001, Dawn Song, Neil Zhenqiang Gong
SACMAT2
2026 PromptLocate: Localizing Prompt Injection Attacks
abstract
Prompt injection attacks deceive a large language model into completing an attacker-specified task instead of its intended task by contaminating its input data with an injected prompt, which consists of injected instruction(s) and data. Localizing the injected prompt within contaminated data is crucial for post-attack forensic analysis and data recovery. Despite its growing importance, prompt injection localization remains largely unexplored. In this work, we bridge this gap by proposing PromptLocate, the first method for localizing injected prompts. PromptLocate comprises three steps: (1) splitting the contaminated data into semantically coherent segments, (2) identifying segments contaminated by injected instructions, and (3) pinpointing segments contaminated by injected data. We show PromptLocate accurately localizes injected prompts across eight existing and eight adaptive attacks.
Yuqi Jia 0001, Yupei Liu, Zedian Shao, Jinyuan Jia 0001, Neil Zhenqiang Gong
SP3
2025 WebInject: Prompt Injection Attack to Web Agents
abstract
Multi-modal large language model (MLLM)-based web agents interact with webpage environments by generating actions based on screenshots of the webpages. In this work, we propose WebInject, a prompt injection attack that manipulates the webpage environment to induce a web agent to perform an attacker-specified action. Our attack adds a perturbation to the raw pixel values of the rendered webpage. After these perturbed pixels are mapped into a screenshot, the perturbation induces the web agent to perform the attacker-specified action. We formulate the task of finding the perturbation as an optimization problem. A key challenge in solving this problem is that the mapping between raw pixel values and screenshot is non-differentiable, making it difficult to backpropagate gradients to the perturbation. To overcome this, we train a neural network to approximate the mapping and apply projected gradient descent to solve the reformulated optimization problem. Extensive evaluation on multiple datasets shows that WebInject is highly effective and significantly outperforms baselines.
John Bloch, Zedian Shao, Yuepeng Hu, Shuyan Zhou, Neil Zhenqiang Gong
EMNLP3
2024 Align Before Collaborate: Mitigating Feature Misalignment for Robust Multi-agent Perception
Kun Yang 0010, Dingkang Yang, Ke Li 0015, Dongling Xiao, Zedian Shao, Peng Sun 0007
ECCV (4)5
2024 The evolution of detection systems and their application for intelligent transportation systems: From solo to symphony
Zedian Shao, Kun Yang 0010, Peng Sun 0007, Yulin Hu, Azzedine Boukerche
Comput. Commun.1