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Genglin Wang

dblp:383/5136 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0008-4686-744XORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Computer networks · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Network security · 54% Hardware security and side channels · 38% Security and privacy of machine learning · 9%
Computer networks
1 paper
Wireless sensing and localization · 77% Internet of things and sensor networks · 23%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network security › attack strategy
eavesdropping
1.622025
Wireless Eavesdropping on Wired Audio With Radio-Frequency Retroreflector Attack · IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 2025
RF-Parrot: Wireless Eavesdropping on Wired Audio · INFOCOM 2024
Hardware security and side channels › side-channel attack › acoustic side channel
acoustic eavesdropping
0.912025
Wireless Eavesdropping on Wired Audio With Radio-Frequency Retroreflector Attack · IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 2025
Wireless sensing and localization
RF sensing
0.812024
RF-Parrot: Wireless Eavesdropping on Wired Audio · INFOCOM 2024
Security and privacy of machine learning › privacy attack › side-channel eavesdropping
electromagnetic eavesdropping
0.312025
Wireless Eavesdropping on Wired Audio With Radio-Frequency Retroreflector Attack · IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 2025
Hardware security and side channels
side-channel attack
0.312025
Wireless Eavesdropping on Wired Audio With Radio-Frequency Retroreflector Attack · IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 2025
Internet of things and sensor networks
backscatter communication
0.212024
RF-Parrot: Wireless Eavesdropping on Wired Audio · INFOCOM 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

convolutional neural network · 2.4signal processing · 1.5Parallel WaveGAN vocoder · 0.9MOSFET retroreflector · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Wireless Eavesdropping on Wired Audio With Radio-Frequency Retroreflector Attack
abstract
Recent studies have demonstrated the feasibility of eavesdropping on audio via radio frequency signals or videos, which capture physical surface vibrations from surrounding objects. However, these methods are inadequate for intercepting internally transmitted audio through wired media. In this work, we introduce radio-frequency retroreflector attack (RFRA) and bridge this gap by proposing an RFRA-based eavesdropping system,RF-Parrot${}^{\mathbf {2}}$, capable of wirelessly capturing audio signals transmitted through earphone wires. Our system entails embedding a tiny field-effect transistor within the wire to establish a battery-free retroreflector, whose reflective efficiency is correlated with the amplitude of the audio signal. To preserve the details of audio signals, we designed a unique retroreflector using a depletion-mode MOSFET (D-MOSFET). This MOSFET can be triggered by any voltage level present in the audio signals, thus guaranteeing no information loss during activation. However, the D-MOSFET introduces a nonlinear convolution operation on the original audio, resulting in distorted audio eavesdropping. Thus, we devised an engineering solution which utilized a novel convolutional neural network in conjunction with an efficient Parallel WaveGAN vocoder to reconstruct the original audio. Our comprehensive experiments demonstrate a strong similarity between the reconstructed audio and the original, achieving an impressive 95% accuracy in speech command recognition.
Genglin Wang, Zheng Shi 0006, Yanni Yang 0003, Zhenlin An, Pengfei Hu 0001, Xiuzhen Cheng, Jiannong Cao 0001
IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput.1
2024 RF-Parrot: Wireless Eavesdropping on Wired Audio
abstract
Recent works demonstrated that we can eavesdrop on audio by using radio frequency signals or videos to capture the physical surface vibrations of surrounding objects. They fall short when it comes to intercepting internally transmitted audio through wires. In this work, we first address this gap by proposing a new eavesdropping system, RF-Parrot, that can wirelessly capture the audio signal transmitted in earphone wires. Our system involves embedding a tiny field-effect transistor in the wire to create a battery-free retroreflector, with its reflective efficiency tied to the audio signal’s amplitude. To capture full details of the analog audio signals, we engineered a novel retroreflector using a depletion-mode MOSFET, which can be activated by any voltage of the audio signals, ensuring no information loss. We also developed a theoretical model to demystify the nonlinear transmission of the retroreflector, identifying it as a convolution operation on the audio spectrum. Subsequently, we have designed a novel convolutional neural network-based model to accurately reconstruct the original audio. Our extensive experimental results demonstrate that the reconstructed audio bears a strong resemblance to the original audio, achieving an impressive 95% accuracy in speech command recognition.
Yanni Yang 0003, Genglin Wang, Zhenlin An, Xiuzhen Cheng, Pengfei Hu 0001
INFOCOM2