Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Joey Ji
dblp:385/8402
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 2 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Systems and software security · 100% | |
| Artificial intelligence
1 paper |
Language models and text generation · 77% Trustworthy machine learning · 23% |
Topics — the 6 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Systems and software security
vulnerability discovery |
1.7 | 2 | 2025 | BountyBench: Dollar Impact of AI Agent Attackers and Defenders on Real-World Cybersecurity Systems · NeurIPS 2025 Cybench: A Framework for Evaluating Cybersecurity Capabilities and Risks of Language Models · ICLR 2025 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
LLM agents |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Cybench: A Framework for Evaluating Cybersecurity Capabilities and Risks of Language Models · ICLR 2025 |
Systems and software security
exploitation |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | BountyBench: Dollar Impact of AI Agent Attackers and Defenders on Real-World Cybersecurity Systems · NeurIPS 2025 |
Systems and software security
vulnerability patching |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | BountyBench: Dollar Impact of AI Agent Attackers and Defenders on Real-World Cybersecurity Systems · NeurIPS 2025 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › model validation
evaluation of language model capabilities |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Cybench: A Framework for Evaluating Cybersecurity Capabilities and Risks of Language Models · ICLR 2025 |
Systems and software security › vulnerability management
bug bounty programs |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | BountyBench: Dollar Impact of AI Agent Attackers and Defenders on Real-World Cybersecurity Systems · NeurIPS 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
subtask decomposition · 1.7agent scaffolding · 1.7large language model agent · 0.9
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Cybench: A Framework for Evaluating Cybersecurity Capabilities and Risks of Language ModelsabstractLanguage Model (LM) agents for cybersecurity that are capable of autonomously identifying vulnerabilities and executing exploits have potential to cause real-world impact. Policymakers, model providers, and researchers in the AI and cybersecurity communities are interested in quantifying the capabilities of such agents to help mitigate cyberrisk and investigate opportunities for penetration testing. Toward that end, we introduce Cybench, a framework for specifying cybersecurity tasks and evaluating agents on those tasks. We include 40 professional-level Capture the Flag (CTF) tasks from 4 distinct CTF competitions, chosen to be recent, meaningful, and spanning a wide range of difficulties. Each task includes its own description, starter files, and is initialized in an environment where an agent can execute commands and observe outputs. Since many tasks are beyond the capabilities of existing LM agents, we introduce subtasks for each task, which break down a task into intermediary steps for a more detailed evaluation. To evaluate agent capabilities, we construct a cybersecurity agent and evaluate 8 models: GPT-4o, OpenAI o1-preview, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Mixtral 8x22b Instruct, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Llama 3 70B Chat, and Llama 3.1 405B Instruct. For the top performing models (GPT-4o and Claude 3.5 Sonnet), we further investigate performance across 4 agent scaffolds (structured bash, action-only, pseudoterminal, and web search). Without subtask guidance, agents leveraging Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4o, OpenAI o1-preview, and Claude 3 Opus successfully solved complete tasks that took human teams up to 11 minutes to solve. In comparison, the most difficult task took human teams 24 hours and 54 minutes to solve. Anonymized code and data are available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kp3H0pw1WMAH-Qyyn9WA0ZKmEa7Cr4D4 and https://drive.google.com/file/d/1BcTQ02BBR0m5LYTiK-tQmIK17_TxijIy. Andy K. Zhang, Neil Perry, Riya Dulepet, Joey Ji, Celeste Menders, Justin W. Lin, Eliot Jones, Gashon Hussein, Samantha Liu, Donovan Jasper, Pura Peetathawatchai, Ari Glenn, Vikram Sivashankar, Daniel Zamoshchin, Leo Glikbarg, Derek Askaryar, Haoxiang Yang, Aolin Zhang, Rishi Alluri, Nathan Tran |
ICLR | 4 |
| 2025 | BountyBench: Dollar Impact of AI Agent Attackers and Defenders on Real-World Cybersecurity SystemsabstractAI agents have the potential to significantly alter the cybersecurity landscape. Here, we introduce the first framework to capture offensive and defensive cyber-capabilities in evolving real-world systems. Instantiating this framework with BountyBench, we set up 25 systems with complex, real-world codebases. To capture the vulnerability lifecycle, we define three task types: Detect (detecting a new vulnerability), Exploit (exploiting a given vulnerability), and Patch (patching a given vulnerability). For Detect, we construct a new success indicator, which is general across vulnerability types and provides localized evaluation. We manually set up the environment for each system, including installing packages, setting up server(s), and hydrating database(s). We add 40 bug bounties, which are vulnerabilities with monetary awards from \\$10 to \\$30,485, covering 9 of the OWASP Top 10 Risks. To modulate task difficulty, we devise a new strategy based on information to guide detection, interpolating from identifying a zero day to exploiting a given vulnerability. We evaluate 10 agents: Claude Code, OpenAI Codex CLI with o3-high and o4-mini, and custom agents with o3-high, GPT-4.1, Gemini 2.5 Pro Preview, Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking, Qwen3 235B A22B, Llama 4 Maverick, and DeepSeek-R1. Given up to three attempts, the top-performing agents are OpenAI Codex CLI: o3-high (12.5% on Detect, mapping to \\$3,720; 90% on Patch, mapping to \\$14,152), Custom Agent with Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking (67.5% on Exploit), and OpenAI Codex CLI: o4-mini (90% on Patch, mapping to \\$14,422). OpenAI Codex CLI: o3-high, OpenAI Codex CLI: o4-mini, and Claude Code are more capable at defense, achieving higher Patch scores of 90%, 90%, and 87.5%, compared to Exploit scores of 47.5%, 32.5%, and 57.5% respectively; while the custom agents are relatively balanced between offense and defense, achieving Exploit scores of 17.5-67.5% and Patch scores of 25-60%. Andy K. Zhang, Joey Ji, Celeste Menders, Riya Dulepet, Thomas Qin, Ron Yifeng Wang, Junrong Wu, Kyleen Liao, Jinghan Hu, Sara Hong, Nardos Demilew, Shivatmica Murgai, Jason Tran, Nishka Kacheria, Ethan Ho, Denis Liu, Lauren McLane, Olivia Bruvik, Dai-Rong Han, Seungwoo Kim, Akhil Vyas, Cuiyuanxiu Chen, Weiran Xu, Jonathan Z. Ye, Prerit Choudhary, Siddharth M. Bhatia, Vikram Sivashankar, Yuxuan Bao, Dawn Song, Dan Boneh, Daniel E. Ho, Percy Liang |
NeurIPS | 2 |