Content based video search services find extensive applications across various domains including video surveillance and object detection. In recent times, researchers have increasingly turned their attention towards enhancing the security of video search over outsourced encrypted videos. Nonetheless, prior researchers often leverage cost-expensive techniques like Homomorphic encryption or Order-preserving encryption to ensure privacy preservation. To reduce the overhead, Bloom Filter (BF)-encoded keyword search is a promising technology for retrieving encrypted videos with image queries. However, it generally suffers from serious data privacy leakage since it will reveal the inclusion relationship between “1” and “0” in the BF. Fortunately, the privacy-preserving bloom filter-based search scheme (PBKS) was recently proposed to achieve secure and effective search while protecting the values in BFs, but it still has two limitations. One is the size of a search token is very large in some cases and the other is the cloud server can infer the true value of each bit in the BF by doing a few operations. In this paper, we propose an efficient and confidentiality-preserving bloom filter-encoded video search (ECVS) scheme for retrieving encrypted videos with image queries. We first design a new CPRF (prefix-constrained pseudorandom function)-based token compression method to reduce the size of the search token and reduce the communication cost largely. Furthermore, we customize a periodic refresh mechanism to conceal the true value of each bit in the BF while avoiding excessive computational pressure on resource-limited users. Security analysis and experiments confirm the security and efficiency of our schemes.

Permissioned blockchain is a promising methodology to build zero-trust storage foundation with trusted data storage and sharing for the zero-trust network. However, the inherent full-backup feature of the permissioned blockchain poses potential data privacy risks and substantial storage costs, hindering its usage as a storage medium. These issues necessitate the usage of secure data deduplication technology to mitigate them. Unfortunately, current secure data deduplication schemes are predominantly designed with centralized cloud servers in mind and are not suitable for distributed blockchain systems. The reason is that the full backup feature of the permissioned blockchain renders a wide attack surface to offline brute-force and frequency analysis attacks. In response, we propose DedupChain, a secure blockchain-enabled storage system with deduplication for zero-trust networks. DedupChain employs a trusted execution environment (i.e., Inter SGX enclave) in conjunction with Oblivious RAM (ORAM) to offer a novel security guarantee namedoblivious data deduplication, which empowers DedupChain with the ability to defend offline brute-force and frequency analysis attacks. DedupChain also proposes several novel techniques to address the security and efficiency issues raised by the SGX enclave. We implemented a system prototype of DedupChain and evaluated its performance metrics. Our experimental results show that DedupChain exhibits satisfactory operational delays, throughput, and storage overhead. Security analysis shows that DedupChain is robust enough to withstand several types of attacks. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply secure data deduplication techniques to address data privacy and storage cost issues raised by permissioned blockchain when used as a zero-trust storage medium.