Coordination lies at the heart of many economic phenomena. A well-known example is currency crises, in which traders decide whether to launch a speculative attack. On one hand, shocks to the currency's fundamentals can propagate: as more traders attack, the central bank's foreign reserves are depleted, which in turn encourages further attacks as traders seek to exploit a weakening currency. On the other hand, shocks can also fizzle out: traders may quickly learn that the central bank's balance sheet is strong, causing pessimism to dissipate and attacks to subside. When do shocks propagate, and when do they fizzle out? In particular, how do these outcomes depend on the speed at which traders learn about the fundamental?

Coordination and learning both play fundamental roles in social and economic life. For instance, investors would like to coordinate their loan decisions with other investors, but also learn over time about the profitability of a company; consumers would like to adopt a networked product if other consumers do the same, but also learn over time about the quality of the product; citizens would like to protest if others also turn out, but also learn over time about the venality of the current regime. In each of these examples, whether coordination succeeds or fails is shaped by the dynamic information environment---who learns what, what is learnt, and how quickly. Thus, dynamic information is a powerful tool for shaping coordination outcomes.