In this paper, we present a preliminary ontology of bias based on the DOLCE foundational ontology. The main reason for devising such an endeavour is to make explicit the ontological assumptions behind the use of terms indicating the elements composing a biased outcome. Firstly, we discuss what the object of a bias is —namely, the entity that might be deemed biased, which we identify with situated inferences, i.e. propositional contents that can be asserted by some (human or artificial) agent from other propositional contents. We will thus categorise in DOLCE various types of biases as concepts that classify situated inferences. The content of such inferences is then associated with the following elements: i) the agent responsible for drawing the conclusion, ii) the objects and iii) the concepts used in the premises and in the conclusion of the inference, iv) the time when the inference takes place. These ingredients will serve to trace the origin of what we shall call a biased inference back to any of the above elements, relating some of the biases present in the literature to these ontologically founded elements.

Research in Digital Humanities calls for computational systems to document, compare, and analyze interpretations of cultural artifacts such as literary texts. These systems are intended to support scholars, critics, and students by facilitating access to existing analyses of texts, identifying similarities and divergences between interpretations, and more. We propose an approach for documenting interpretations of literary characters, grounded in the empirical practices of literary interpretation to align closely with experts’ methods. To achieve this, we remain neutral regarding the ontological status of characters, instead relying on formal approaches based on linguistics. We demonstrate how our approach can analyze relations between names of fictional characters across texts and authors, bridging discussions in analytic philosophy about identity with the interests of literary scholars.

We present an ontological analysis of the notion of group agency developed by Christian List and Philip Pettit. We focus on this notion as it allows us to neatly distinguish groups, organizations, corporations – to which we may ascribe agency – from mere aggregates of individuals. We develop a module for group agency within a foundational ontology and we apply it to organizations.

Moving from some reflections on the empirical practice of measurement and on the nature of visual perception, we present a constructivist approach to objects. At the basis of such approach there is the idea that all we may know about what is out there is always mediated by some sort of apparatus, being it a measurement instrument or our perceptual system. Given this perspective, some questions are in order: how are objects identified and re-identified through time from the outcomes of apparatuses? How can we distinguish different (kinds of) objects? Our first goal will be to make explicit the mechanism used to build objects from the apparatuses' outcomes, emphasizing what are the ontological and representational problems this construction faces. A second contribution will be a preliminary discussion of some possible ways to distinguish social objects, the constructed objects par excellence, from physical ones. A third contribution will be an attempt to make a bridge between two scientific communities that rarely seek contact or mutual recognition: that of formal ontologies and that of formal concept analysis.