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Dishank Goel

dblp:392/9256 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0001-7577-6394ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Web and mobile security · 50% Authentication and access control · 50%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Web and mobile security
browser security
0.912025
Least Privilege Access for Persistent Storage Mechanisms in Web Browsers · WWW 2025
Authentication and access control › access control
least privilege
0.912025
Least Privilege Access for Persistent Storage Mechanisms in Web Browsers · WWW 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

label-based access control · 0.9empirical measurement · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Least Privilege Access for Persistent Storage Mechanisms in Web Browsers
abstract
Web applications often include third-party content to personalize a user's online experience. These scripts have unrestricted access to a user's private data stored in the browser's persistent storage, associated with the host page. Various mechanisms have been implemented to restrict access to these storage objects, however, the existing mechanisms provide an all-or-none access and do not work in scenarios where web applications need to allow controlled access to cookies and localstorage objects by third-party scripts. If some of these scripts behave maliciously, they can easily access and modify private user information that are stored in the browser objects. The goal of our work is to design a mechanism to enforce fine-grained control of persistent storage objects. We perform an empirical study of persistent storage access by third-party scripts on Tranco's top 10,000 websites and find that 89.84% of all cookie accesses, 90.98% of all localstorage accesses and 72.49% of IndexedDB accesses are done by third-party scripts. Our approach enforces least privilege access for third-party scripts on these objects to ensure their security by attaching labels to the storage objects that specify which domains are allowed to read from and write to these objects. We implement our approach on the Firefox browser and show that it effectively blocks scripts from other domains, which are not allowed access based on these labels, from accessing the storage objects. We show that our enforcement results in some functionality breakage in websites with the default settings, which can be fixed by correctly labeling the storage objects used by the third-party scripts.
Gayatri Priyadarsini Kancherla, Dishank Goel, Abhishek Bichhawat
WWW2