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Clayton Allard

dblp:395/2744 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100%
Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
1 paper
Medical and health informatics · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack
0.912025
Prompt2Perturb (P2P): Text-Guided Diffusion-Based Adversarial Attack on Breast Ultrasound Images · CVPR 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › adversarial attacks on generative models
diffusion-based adversarial attack
0.912025
Prompt2Perturb (P2P): Text-Guided Diffusion-Based Adversarial Attack on Breast Ultrasound Images · CVPR 2025
Medical and health informatics › medical imaging › ultrasound imaging
breast ultrasound imaging
0.312025
Prompt2Perturb (P2P): Text-Guided Diffusion-Based Adversarial Attack on Breast Ultrasound Images · CVPR 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

text embedding optimization · 1.7learnable prompt · 1.7diffusion model · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Prompt2Perturb (P2P): Text-Guided Diffusion-Based Adversarial Attack on Breast Ultrasound Images
abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) offer significant promise for improving breast cancer diagnosis in medical imaging. However, these models are highly susceptible to adversarial attacks—small, imperceptible changes that can mislead classifiers—raising critical concerns about their reliability and security. Traditional attacks rely on fixed-norm perturbations, misaligning with human perception. In contrast, diffusion-based attacks require pre-trained models, demanding substantial data when these models are unavailable, limiting practical use in data-scarce scenarios. In medical imaging, however, this is often unfeasible due to the limited availability of datasets. Building on recent advancements in learnable prompts, we propose Prompt2Perturb (P2P), a novel language-guided attack method capable of generating meaningful attack examples driven by text instructions. During the prompt learning phase, our approach leverages learnable prompts within the text encoder to create subtle, yet impactful, perturbations that remain imperceptible while guiding the model towards targeted outcomes. In contrast to current prompt learning-based approaches, our P2P stands out by directly updating text embeddings, avoiding the need for retraining diffusion models. Further, we leverage the finding that optimizing only the early diffusion steps boosts efficiency while ensuring that the generated adversarial examples incorporate subtle noise, thus preserving ultrasound image quality without introducing noticeable artifacts. We show that our method outperforms state-of-the-art attack techniques across three breast ultrasound datasets in FID and LPIPS. Moreover, the generated images are both more natural in appearance and more effective compared to existing adversarial attacks. Our Code is publicly available on GitHub.
Yasamin Medghalchi, Moein Heidari, Clayton Allard, Leonid Sigal, Ilker Hacihaliloglu
CVPR3