Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

Zhenhu Wu

dblp:396/6960 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Trustworthy machine learning · 50% Autonomous driving · 25% 3D vision · 25%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › adversarial machine learning › physical adversarial attack
adversarial patch attack
0.812024
Beware of Road Markings: A New Adversarial Patch Attack to Monocular Depth Estimation · NeurIPS 2024
Computer vision › 3D vision › depth estimation
monocular depth estimation
0.812024
Beware of Road Markings: A New Adversarial Patch Attack to Monocular Depth Estimation · NeurIPS 2024
Robotics › Autonomous driving
perception
0.812024
Beware of Road Markings: A New Adversarial Patch Attack to Monocular Depth Estimation · NeurIPS 2024
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness
0.812024
Beware of Road Markings: A New Adversarial Patch Attack to Monocular Depth Estimation · NeurIPS 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

road marking camouflage · 0.8adversarial patch · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Beware of Road Markings: A New Adversarial Patch Attack to Monocular Depth Estimation
abstract
Monocular Depth Estimation (MDE) enables the prediction of scene depths from a single RGB image, having been widely integrated into production-grade autonomous driving systems, e.g., Tesla Autopilot. Current adversarial attacks to MDE models focus on attaching an optimized adversarial patch to a designated obstacle. Although effective, this approach presents two inherent limitations: its reliance on specific obstacles and its limited malicious impact. In contrast, we propose a pioneering attack to MDE models that \textit{decouples obstacles from patches physically and deploys optimized patches on roads}, thereby extending the attack scope to arbitrary traffic participants. This approach is inspired by our groundbreaking discovery: \textit{various MDE models with different architectures, trained for autonomous driving, heavily rely on road regions} when predicting depths for different obstacles. Based on this discovery, we design the Adversarial Road Marking (AdvRM) attack, which camouflages patches as ordinary road markings and deploys them on roads, thereby posing a continuous threat within the environment. Experimental results from both dataset simulations and real-world scenarios demonstrate that AdvRM is effective, stealthy, and robust against various MDE models, achieving about 1.507 of Mean Relative Shift Ratio (MRSR) over 8 MDE models. The code is available at \url{https://github.com/a-c-a-c/AdvRM.git}
Hangcheng Liu, Zhenhu Wu, Hao Wang 0003, Xingshuo Han, Shangwei Guo, Tao Xiang 0001, Tianwei Zhang 0004
NeurIPS2