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Yongli Xiang

dblp:397/2622 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
2 papers
Trustworthy machine learning · 92% Learning theory · 8%
Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100%

Topics — the 7 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › model security
non-transferable learning
1.122025
Toward Robust Non-Transferable Learning: A Survey and Benchmark · IJCAI 2025
Jailbreaking the Non-Transferable Barrier via Test-Time Data Disguising · CVPR 2025
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
adversarial robustness
0.912025
Toward Robust Non-Transferable Learning: A Survey and Benchmark · IJCAI 2025
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness
0.912025
Toward Robust Non-Transferable Learning: A Survey and Benchmark · IJCAI 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack
0.912025
Jailbreaking the Non-Transferable Barrier via Test-Time Data Disguising · CVPR 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
black-box attack
0.912025
Jailbreaking the Non-Transferable Barrier via Test-Time Data Disguising · CVPR 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning
model intellectual property protection
0.912025
Jailbreaking the Non-Transferable Barrier via Test-Time Data Disguising · CVPR 2025
Machine learning › Learning theory › generalization
model generalization
0.312025
Toward Robust Non-Transferable Learning: A Survey and Benchmark · IJCAI 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

test-time data disguising · 1.7domain discrepancy minimization · 1.7benchmark evaluation · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Jailbreaking the Non-Transferable Barrier via Test-Time Data Disguising
abstract
Non-Transferable learning (NTL) has been proposed to protect model intellectual property (IP) by creating a "nontransferable barrier" to restrict generalization from authorized to unauthorized domains. Recently, well-designed attack, which restores the unauthorized-domain performance by fine-tuning NTL models on few authorized samples, highlights the security risks of NTL-based applications. However, such attack requires modifying model weights, thus being invalid in the black-box scenario. This raises a critical question: can we trust the security of NTL models deployed as black-box systems? In this work, we reveal the first loophole of black-box NTL models by proposing a novel attack method (dubbed as JailNTL) to jailbreak the non-transferable barrier through test-time data disguising. The main idea of JailNTL is to disguise unauthorized data so it can be identified as authorized by the NTL model, thereby bypassing the non-transferable barrier without modifying the NTL model weights. Specifically, JailNTL encourages unauthorized-domain disguising in two levels, including: (i) data-intrinsic disguising (DID) for eliminating domain discrepancy and preserving class-related content at the input-level, and (ii) model-guided disguising (MGD) for mitigating output-level statistics difference of the NTL model. Empirically, when attacking state-of-the-art (SOTA) NTL models in the black-box scenario, Jail-Ntl achieves an accuracy increase of up to 55.7% in the unauthorized domain by using only 1% authorized samples, largely exceeding existing SOTA white-box attacks. Code is released at https://github.com/tmllab/2025_CVPR_JailNTL.
Yongli Xiang, Ziming Hong, Lina Yao 0001, Dadong Wang, Tongliang Liu
CVPR1
2025 Toward Robust Non-Transferable Learning: A Survey and Benchmark
abstract
Over the past decades, researchers have primarily focused on improving the generalization abilities of models, with limited attention given to regulating such generalization. However, the ability of models to generalize to unintended data (e.g., harmful or unauthorized data) can be exploited by malicious adversaries in unforeseen ways, potentially resulting in violations of model ethics. Non-transferable learning (NTL), a task aimed at reshaping the generalization abilities of deep learning models, was proposed to address these challenges. While numerous methods have been proposed in this field, a comprehensive review of existing progress and a thorough analysis of current limitations remain lacking. In this paper, we bridge this gap by presenting the first comprehensive survey on NTL and introducing NTLBench, the first benchmark to evaluate NTL performance and robustness within a unified framework. Specifically, we first introduce the task settings, general framework, and criteria of NTL, followed by a summary of NTL approaches. Furthermore, we emphasize the often-overlooked issue of robustness against various attacks that can destroy the non-transferable mechanism established by NTL. Experiments conducted via NTLBench verify the limitations of existing NTL methods in robustness. Finally, we discuss the practical applications of NTL, along with its future directions and associated challenges.
Ziming Hong, Yongli Xiang, Tongliang Liu
IJCAI2