Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant utility in a wide range of applications; however, their deployment is plagued by security vulnerabilities, notably jailbreak attacks. These attacks manipulate LLMs to generate harmful or unethical content by crafting adversarial prompts. While much of the current research on jailbreak attacks has focused on single-turn interactions, it has largely overlooked the impact of historical dialogues on model behavior. Although recent studies have explored multi-turn jailbreak attacks, they generally assume that the attacker can only manipulate the user prompt. In contrast, we highlight that an attacker can also control the model’s previous outputs. To this end, we introduce DIA, a new paradigm that leverages fabricated dialogue history to enhance jailbreak effectiveness. DIA operates in a black-box setting, requiring only access to the chat API or knowledge of the LLM’s chat template. We propose two methods for constructing adversarial historical dialogues: one adapts gray-box prefilling attacks, and the other exploits deferred responses. Our experiments demonstrate that DIA achieves state-of-the-art attack success rates on recent LLMs, including Llama-3.1 and GPT-4o. Additionally, we show that DIA can bypass 6 different defense mechanisms, highlighting its robustness.