Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

Yow-Fu Liou

dblp:405/6364 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Trustworthy machine learning · 87% Language models and text generation · 13%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › large language model trustworthiness
large language model robustness
1.012026
Obedience or Vigilance? How Large Language Models React to Malicious Multiple-Choice Options (Student Abstract) · AAAI 2026
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness
1.012026
Obedience or Vigilance? How Large Language Models React to Malicious Multiple-Choice Options (Student Abstract) · AAAI 2026
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation › natural language understanding › question answering
multiple-choice question answering
0.312026
Obedience or Vigilance? How Large Language Models React to Malicious Multiple-Choice Options (Student Abstract) · AAAI 2026

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

option injection · 1.0black-box auditing · 1.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Obedience or Vigilance? How Large Language Models React to Malicious Multiple-Choice Options (Student Abstract)
abstract
When evaluating large language models (LLMs) for question answering tasks, a common protocol is multiple-choice question-answering (MCQA), where the model selects from a fixed set of choices. In contemporary robustness testing, researchers typically perturb instructions or introduce confusion into factual statements; however, model behavior also hinges on choice compliance: whether models remain within the canonical set A-D. We formalize this setting by asking whether the model continues to respect the interface's rules when the problem presents a tempting alternative. Our approach is interface-preserving: we append a single selectable option E while keeping the question and A-D unchanged. Then, we introduce three types of malicious option injection to assess LLMs' robustness. Experimental results highlight the vulnerability of LLMs on contradict type content of the additional option E. Our evaluation framework can effectively serve as a low-cost audit of rule adherence on existing datasets and black-box models, surfaces off-policy items, and supports interpretable model comparison for deployment.
Yow-Fu Liou, Yu-Chien Tang, An-Zi Yen
AAAI1