Recent advances in large reasoning models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced long-chain reasoning capabilities over standard large language models (LLMs). However, LRMs often produce unnecessarily lengthy outputs even for simple queries, leading to inefficiencies or even accuracy degradation compared to LLMs. To address this, we propose CP-Router, a training-free, model-agnostic routing framework that dynamically selects between an LLM and an LRM, demonstrated with multiple-choice question answering (MCQA) prompts. The routing decision is guided by the prediction uncertainty estimates derived via Conformal Prediction (CP), which provides rigorous coverage guarantees. To improve uncertainty differentiation across inputs, we introduce Full and Binary Entropy (FBE), a novel entropy-based criterion that adaptively selects the appropriate CP threshold. Experiments across MCQA and QA benchmarks—including mathematics, logical reasoning, and Chinese chemistry—demonstrate that CP-Router efficiently reduces token usage while maintaining or even improving accuracy compared to using LRM alone. We further demonstrate the generality and robustness of CP-Router by extending it to diverse model pairings beyond the LLM–LRM setting.

Zhaofen Wu, Hanrong Zhang, Fulin Lin, Wujiang Xu, Xinran Xu, Yankai Chen, Henry Peng Zou, Shaowen Chen, Weizhi Zhang, Xue Liu, Philip S. Yu, Hongwei Wang. Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers). 2026.

Self-supervised learning (SSL) models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Existing backdoor attacks that are effective in SSL often involve noticeable triggers, like colored patches or visible noise, which are vulnerable to human inspection. This paper proposes an imperceptible and effective backdoor attack against self-supervised models. We first find that existing imperceptible triggers designed for supervised learning are less effective in compromising self-supervised models. We then identify this ineffectiveness is attributed to the overlap in distributions between the backdoor and augmented samples used in SSL. Building on this insight, we design an attack using optimized triggers disentangled with the augmented transformation in the SSL, while remaining imperceptible to human vision. Experiments on five datasets and six SSL algorithms demonstrate our attack is highly effective and stealthy. It also has strong resistance to existing backdoor defenses. Our code can be found at https://github.com/Zhang-Henry/INACTIVE.