Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Thodoris Tsilivis
dblp:410/2834
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0005-1552-7918ORCID · reported
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › algorithmic mechanism design
approximation mechanisms |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Bilateral Trade with Interdependent Values: Information vs. Approximation · EC 2025 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
bilateral trade |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Bilateral Trade with Interdependent Values: Information vs. Approximation · EC 2025 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory
interdependent values |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Bilateral Trade with Interdependent Values: Information vs. Approximation · EC 2025 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
mechanism design |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Bilateral Trade with Interdependent Values: Information vs. Approximation · EC 2025 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
welfare maximization |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Bilateral Trade with Interdependent Values: Information vs. Approximation · EC 2025 |
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Bilateral Trade with Interdependent Values: Information vs. ApproximationabstractWelfare maximization in bilateral trade has been extensively studied in recent years. Previous literature obtained incentive-compatible approximation mechanisms only for the private values case. In this paper, we study welfare maximization in bilateral trade with interdependent values. Designing mechanisms for interdependent settings is much more challenging because the values of the players depend on the private information of the others, requiring complex belief updates and strategic inference. Shahar Dobzinski, Alon Eden, Kira Goldner, Ariel Shaulker, Thodoris Tsilivis |
EC | 5 |