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Andrew Gan

dblp:412/4102 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0003-1244-0230ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 50% Systems and software security · 50%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
GPUs and heterogeneous computing · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security
supply chain security
0.912025
Sentry: Authenticating Machine Learning Artifacts on the Fly · CCS 2025
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments
0.912025
Sentry: Authenticating Machine Learning Artifacts on the Fly · CCS 2025
GPUs and heterogeneous computing
GPU computing
0.312025
Sentry: Authenticating Machine Learning Artifacts on the Fly · CCS 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

merkle tree · 1.7lattice hashing · 1.7cryptographic signing · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Sentry: Authenticating Machine Learning Artifacts on the Fly
abstract
Machine learning systems increasingly rely on open-source artifacts such as datasets and models that are created or hosted by other parties. The reliance on external datasets and pre-trained models exposes the system to supply chain attacks where an artifact can be poisoned before it is delivered to the end-user. Such attacks are possible due to the lack of any authenticity verification in existing machine learning systems. Incorporating cryptographic solutions such as hashing and signing can mitigate the risk of supply chain attacks. However, existing frameworks for integrity verification based on cryptographic techniques can incur significant overhead when applied to state-of-the-art machine learning artifacts due to their scale, and are not compatible with GPU platforms. In this paper, we develop Sentry, a novel GPU-based framework that verifies the authenticity of machine learning artifacts by implementing cryptographic signing and verification for datasets and models. Sentry ties developer identities to signatures and performs authentication on the fly as artifacts are loaded on GPU memory, making it compatible with GPU data movement solutions such as NVIDIA GPUDirect that bypass the CPU. Sentry incorporates GPU acceleration of cryptographic hash constructions such as Merkle tree and lattice hashing, implementing memory optimizations and resource partitioning schemes for a high throughput performance. Our evaluations show that Sentry is a practical solution to bring authenticity to machine learning systems, achieving orders of magnitude speedup over a CPU-based baseline.
Andrew Gan, Zahra Ghodsi
CCS1