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Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert

Kosi Nwabueze

dblp:417/3967 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0002-0770-0344ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 50% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 50%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Processor architecture and microarchitecture · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › cryptographic implementation
constant-time implementation		 0.912025
Securing Cryptographic Software via Typed Assembly Language · CCS 2025
Hardware security and side channels
side-channel countermeasures		 0.912025
Securing Cryptographic Software via Typed Assembly Language · CCS 2025
Processor architecture and microarchitecture › speculative execution › speculative execution attacks
spectre		 0.312025
Securing Cryptographic Software via Typed Assembly Language · CCS 2025
Processor architecture and microarchitecture
speculative execution		 0.312025
Securing Cryptographic Software via Typed Assembly Language · CCS 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

typed assembly language · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Securing Cryptographic Software via Typed Assembly Language
abstract
Authors of cryptographic software are well aware that their code should not leak secrets through its timing behavior, and, until 2018, they believed that following industry-standard constant-time coding guidelines was sufficient. However, the revelation of the Spectre family of speculative execution attacks injected new complexities.
Shixin Song, Tingzhen Dong, Kosi Nwabueze, Julian Zanders, Andres Erbsen, Adam Chlipala, Mengjia Yan 0001
 CCS3