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Cristian Munteanu 0001

dblp:42/4751-1 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
4as first author
4since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0002-3728-9958ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Computer networks · 3 · 3 first-author · 3 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
4 papers
Network security · 51% Malware analysis · 16% Systems and software security · 16%
Computer networks
2 papers
Network measurement and analytics · 100%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 9, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Malware analysis
botnet
0.912025
Attacks Come to Those Who Wait: Long-Term Observations in an SSH Honeynet · IMC 2025
Network security › cyber deception
honeynet
0.912025
Attacks Come to Those Who Wait: Long-Term Observations in an SSH Honeynet · IMC 2025
Network security › cyber deception
honeypot
0.712023
Fifteen Months in the Life of a Honeyfarm · IMC 2023
Network security › intrusion detection and prevention
intrusion detection
0.312025
Catch-22: Uncovering Compromised Hosts using SSH Public Keys · USENIX Security Symposium 2025
Network measurement and analytics › internet measurement
internet infrastructure measurement
0.212024
Poster: The State of Malware Loaders · IMC 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

honeynet · 1.7measurement study · 0.9honeypot monitoring · 0.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Attacks Come to Those Who Wait: Long-Term Observations in an SSH Honeynet
abstract
Numerous studies have explored SSH attacks, often focusing on specific botnet activities or providing short-term analyses of particular honeynets. In this paper, we present an analysis of data collected from a large-scale honeynet over a three-year period, shedding light on gradual shifts in attacker behavior. Our findings suggest a trend toward more exploratory attacks, with indications that attackers are increasingly moving beyond the blind execution of scripts.
Cristian Munteanu 0001, Yogesh Bhargav Suriyanarayanan, Georgios Smaragdakis, Anja Feldmann, Tobias Fiebig
IMC1
2025 Catch-22: Uncovering Compromised Hosts using SSH Public Keys
Cristian Munteanu 0001, Georgios Smaragdakis, Anja Feldmann, Tobias Fiebig
USENIX Security Symposium1
2024 Poster: The State of Malware Loaders
abstract
Malware is recognized as one of the most severe cybersecurity threats today. Although malware attacks are as old as the Internet, our understanding of which part of the Internet infrastructure is used to distribute malware software is still rather limited.
Cristian Munteanu 0001, Georgios Smaragdakis, Anja Feldmann
IMC1
2023 Fifteen Months in the Life of a Honeyfarm
abstract
Honeypots have been used for decades to detect, monitor, and understand attempts of unauthorized use of information systems. Previous studies focused on characterizing the spread of malware, e.g., Mirai and other attacks, or proposed stealthy and interactive architectures to improve honeypot efficiency.
Cristian Munteanu 0001, Said Jawad Saidi, Oliver Gasser, Georgios Smaragdakis, Anja Feldmann
IMC1