The implementation of QoS provisioning at the MAC layer requires users to classify their traffic into QoS categories. In realistic scenarios where users are selfish and interested in maximizing their own utility, users may have an interest in misrepresenting the QoS category of their traffic. We examine a simplified model for IEEE 802.11e networks in which channel access can be obtained via random access or polling. Using concepts from game theory, we show that a polling based incentive mechanism can stimulate users to truthfully report the QoS category of their traffic. Furthermore, we show that our incentive mechanism improves the system capacity, in terms of the number of QoS constrained users that can be admitted, when users are strategic.

In this paper, we examine the use of pricing for distributed, incentive-compatible and socially optimal resource allocation in a QoS-differentiated random-access wireless network. We argue that QoS mechanisms in wireless networks are susceptible to misuse by self-interested users. We first present a simple pricing scheme that leads to social optimality (i.e., achieves QoS-differentiated proportional fairness) when users' utility functions are known to the AP. We then characterize the price of anarchy when users are strategic. Finally, the centerpiece of this paper is a pricing scheme that ensures socially optimal operation as a Nash equilibrium strategy among users whose utility functions are not known and who attempt to access the channel in a decentralized manner.

To implement network coding, users need to coordinate and cooperate with respect to their strategies in terms of duplicating and transmitting side information across specific parts of the network. In unicast applications where users have no inherent interest in providing (or concealing) their information to (or from) any destinations except for their unique one, this assumption becomes critical in the face of users' autonomy. This paper addresses the issue of cooperation in unicast network coding via a game theoretic approach. Implementation of a given network coding scheme induces a network coding game among source-destination pairs (users). In a network with autonomous and rational unicast flows, the equilibrium properties (as well as efficiency) of a network coding scheme is shown to be related to the properties of the corresponding network coding game. In a simple generalization of butterfly networks with two users, we propose a network coding scheme whose capacity achieving operation coincides with users' dominant strategies.

In this correspondence, we consider joint uplink and downlink rate allocations over a multiaccess/broadcast channel pair in a single-cell system. We assume a network of heterogeneous users, where the uplink utility of each user is held as private information and is unknown to the base station. The challenge is to design an optimal rate allocation scheme in the presence of such incomplete information when considering strategic users. Here, we provide an incentive-compatible mechanism that leverages downlink demand to ensure that users truthfully reveal their uplink utilities, enabling the socially optimal uplink rate allocation. In addition, we give numerical results on a kind of efficiency of downlink allocations for two specific uplink multiple-access channels (MACs): information theoretic additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) , MAC, and code-division multiple-access (CDMA)-based uplink.

In this paper, we formulate an optimal rate allocation scheme for uplink and downlink in a single-cell CDMA system. Using concepts from game theory, we show that it is possible to construct a game in which the socially optimal rate allocation arises as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We further show that this equilibrium can be achieved via a distributed algorithm at the uplink using practical signaling mechanisms.

As the demand for wireless broadband data services grows, it becomes increasingly important to address the issue of optimal resource allocation. Specifically, such allocation should address not only quality of service (QOS) requirements, but continually changing resource demands. This paper examines such optimal resource allocation through nonuniform rate assignment in a CDMA system, using a proportional fair scheme. We also examine distributed algorithms for such a rate assignment, and their performance in dynamic systems.