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Katharina Miesch

dblp:420/7869 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0006-3965-7132ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Network security · 100%
Computer networks
1 paper
Routing and switching · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network security
routing security
0.912025
Poster: The Rocky Road Towards RPKI Algorithm Agility · CCS 2025
Routing and switching › inter-domain routing
BGP
0.312025
Poster: The Rocky Road Towards RPKI Algorithm Agility · CCS 2025
Routing and switching › inter-domain routing › BGP
prefix hijacking
0.312025
Poster: The Rocky Road Towards RPKI Algorithm Agility · CCS 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

elliptic curve cryptography · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Poster: The Rocky Road Towards RPKI Algorithm Agility
abstract
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) already protects around 50% of announced BGP prefixes, and around 28% of systems enforce RPKI validity in routing. RPKI binds ownership of prefixes to public keys inside certificates, which are signed by the respective issuer. For signatures and keys, RPKI currently exclusively supports RSA-2048, forbidding other algorithms and key sizes. In this work, we practically show that RPKI efficiency could significantly benefit from algorithm agility, allowing for smaller more efficient algorithms like Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). We further illustrate that current plans for shifting algorithms, which will eventually become necessary to shift towards quantum-secure algorithms, are infeasible due to bandwidth limitations, validation overhead, and issues with patch management. From our observations, we derive a new agility procedure that uses separate repository versions additional to two separate trees (a mixed tree and a legacy tree) to enable incremental deployment of a new algorithm. In contrast to existing approaches, our procedure provides benefits also for early adopters, facilitating deployment.
Katharina Miesch, Haya Schulmann, Niklas Vogel
CCS1