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Gil Goren

dblp:422/6631 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Trustworthy machine learning · 50% Language models and text generation · 50%
Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
alignment
1.012026
AlignTree: Efficient Defense Against LLM Jailbreak Attacks · AAAI 2026
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness
1.012026
AlignTree: Efficient Defense Against LLM Jailbreak Attacks · AAAI 2026
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack
1.012026
AlignTree: Efficient Defense Against LLM Jailbreak Attacks · AAAI 2026
Security and privacy of machine learning › large language model safety
jailbreak defense
1.012026
AlignTree: Efficient Defense Against LLM Jailbreak Attacks · AAAI 2026

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

support vector machine · 2.0random forest classifier · 2.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 AlignTree: Efficient Defense Against LLM Jailbreak Attacks
abstract
Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that bypass safety guidelines and generate harmful content. Mitigating these vulnerabilities requires defense mechanisms that are both robust and computationally efficient. However, existing approaches either incur high computational costs or rely on lightweight defenses that can be easily circumvented, rendering them impractical for real-world LLM-based systems. In this work, we introduce the AlignTree defense, which enhances model alignment while maintaining minimal computational overhead. AlignTree monitors LLM activations during generation and detects misaligned behavior using an efficient random forest classifier. This classifier operates on two signals: (i) the refusal direction - a linear representation that activates on misaligned prompts, and (ii) an SVM-based signal that captures non-linear features associated with harmful content. Unlike previous methods, AlignTree does not require additional prompts or auxiliary guard models. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate the efficiency and robustness of AlignTree across multiple LLMs and benchmarks.
Gil Goren, Shahar Katz, Lior Wolf
AAAI1