Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data.

Junbeom In

dblp:426/0825 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0006-6729-4017ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Computer networks · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security · 100%
Computer networks
1 paper
Network measurement and analytics · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network measurement and analytics › internet measurement
blockchain network measurement
0.912025
Quantifying the Threat of Sandwiching MEV on Jito: A Measurement of Solana's Leading Validator Client · IMC 2025
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security
maximal extractable value
0.912025
Quantifying the Threat of Sandwiching MEV on Jito: A Measurement of Solana's Leading Validator Client · IMC 2025
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security › maximal extractable value
sandwich attack
0.912025
Quantifying the Threat of Sandwiching MEV on Jito: A Measurement of Solana's Leading Validator Client · IMC 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

transaction ordering analysis · 1.7MEV quantification · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Quantifying the Threat of Sandwiching MEV on Jito: A Measurement of Solana's Leading Validator Client
abstract
Solana has emerged as a major blockchain platform providing high throughput and low fees. Like other blockchains, Solana can be attacked via so-called ''Sandwiching'' attacks, where an attacker observes a pending transaction, quickly buys the target cryptocurrency, lets the transaction go through, and then immediately sells it for a profit, skimming that profit from the user who submitted the transaction. While such attacks have been observed by users, they remain underexplored in academic literature due to technical difficulties studying Solana at scale.
Nicole Gerzon, Ben Weintraub, Junbeom In, Alan Mislove, Cristina Nita-Rotaru
IMC3