Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Jarin Tasneem
dblp:429/6904
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0002-1634-6957ORCID · reported
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 67% Privacy and data protection · 33% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Security and privacy of machine learning
federated learning security |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Breaking Cross-View Associations: Byzantine Model Poisoning Attack against Vertical Federated Learning · AAAI 2026 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
poisoning attack |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Breaking Cross-View Associations: Byzantine Model Poisoning Attack against Vertical Federated Learning · AAAI 2026 |
Privacy and data protection › privacy-preserving machine learning › federated learning privacy
vertical federated learning |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Breaking Cross-View Associations: Byzantine Model Poisoning Attack against Vertical Federated Learning · AAAI 2026 |
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Breaking Cross-View Associations: Byzantine Model Poisoning Attack against Vertical Federated LearningabstractFederated learning (FL) has rapidly emerged as a pivotal framework for cross-silo collaborative training while keeping sensitive data localized, driven by growing data volumes and major privacy concerns. Within this paradigm, vertical federated learning (VFL) enables collaboration among parties holding different features of the same sample space, powering tasks like fraud detection, medical diagnosis, and credit scoring. However, the participation of multiple entities creates new vulnerabilities to malicious interference. One critical yet underexplored threat in VFL is the Byzantine poisoning attack, where an adversary intentionally corrupts training to degrade overall model performance. This work reveals a practical vulnerability showing how a single malicious participant can significantly reduce inference accuracy in a VFL system by breaking cross-view association through feature-space corruption. Our findings emphasize the urgent need for robust, VFL-specific defenses to ensure reliability in collaborative, cross-silo AI systems. Jarin Tasneem |
AAAI | 1 |