Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Murad Aghazada
dblp:430/4143
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
1 paper |
Multi-agent systems · 44% Language models and text generation · 44% Reinforcement learning · 13% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
alignment |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | MERIT Feedback Elicits Better Bargaining in LLM Negotiators · ACL (1) 2026 |
Knowledge, reasoning and agents › Multi-agent systems
automated negotiation |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | MERIT Feedback Elicits Better Bargaining in LLM Negotiators · ACL (1) 2026 |
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning
preference learning |
0.3 | 1 | 2026 | MERIT Feedback Elicits Better Bargaining in LLM Negotiators · ACL (1) 2026 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
utility theory · 1.0prompting · 1.0fine-tuning · 1.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | MERIT Feedback Elicits Better Bargaining in LLM NegotiatorsabstractBargaining is often regarded as a logical arena rather than an art or a matter of intuition, yet Large Language Models (LLMs) still struggle to navigate it due to limited strategic depth and difficulty adapting to complex human factors.Current benchmarks rarely capture this limitation.To bridge this gap, we present a utility feedback centric framework.Our contributions are: (i) AGORABENCH, a new benchmark spanning nine challenging settings (e.g., deception, monopoly) that supports diverse strategy modeling; (ii) human-aligned, economically grounded metrics derived from utility theory.This is operationalized via agent utility, negotiation power, and acquisition ratio that implicitly measure how well the negotiation aligns with human preference and (iii) a human preference grounded dataset with learning pipeline that strengthens LLMs' bargaining ability through both prompting and finetuning.Empirical results indicate that baseline LLM strategies often diverge from human preferences, while our mechanism substantially improves negotiation performance, yielding deeper strategic behavior and stronger opponent awareness. Jihwan Oh, Murad Aghazada, Yooju Shin, Se-Young Yun, Taehyeon Kim 0001 |
ACL (1) | 2 |