Ground-based Augmentation System (GBAS) augments Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) to support the precision approach and landing of aircraft. To guarantee integrity, existing single-frequency GBAS utilizes position-domain geometry screening to eliminate potentially unsafe satellite geometries by inflating one or more broadcast GBAS parameters. However, GBAS availability can be drastically impacted in low-latitude regions where severe ionospheric conditions have been observed. Thus, we developed a novel geometry-screening algorithm in this study to improve GBAS availability in low-latitude regions. Simulations demonstrate that the proposed method can provide 5–8 percentage point availability enhancement of GBAS at Galeão airport near Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, compared to existing methods.

The use of ground-based augmentation systems (GBASs) is increasing in the national airspace system and also in many nations to support aircraft precision approaches and landing. An anomalous ionospheric event if undetected can cause a potential threat to users of single-frequency-based global navigation satellite system augmentation systems. Current GBAS utilize the pre-defined “worst case” ionospheric threat model in their computation of user position errors to consider all possible ionospheric conditions. This could lead to an excessive availability penalty by adding conservatism on the resulting error bounds. This paper proposes a methodology of real-time ionospheric threat adaptation that adjusts the ionospheric threat model in real time instead of always using the same threat model. This is done by using predicted values of space weather indices for determining the corresponding threat model based on an established relationship between space weather indices and ionospheric threats. Since space weather prediction itself is not reliable due to prediction errors, an uncertainty model was derived from 17 years of historical data. When applied to Category I GBAS in the Conterminous United States, this method lowered the upper bound of the current threat model about 95% of the time during the 17 years (from 1995 to 2011) using the bounded prediction value of the disturbance-storm time index.

The United States Navy seeks the capability to land manned and unmanned aerial vehicles autonomously on an aircraft carrier using GPS. To deliver this capability, the Navy is developing a navigation system called the Sea-Based Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS). Because standard GPS is not sufficiently precise to land aircraft on a shortened, constantly moving runway, Sea-Based JPALS leverages dual-frequency, carrier-phase differential GPS navigation. Carrier phase measurements, derived from the sinusoidal waveforms underlying the GPS signal, are very precise but not necessarily accurate unless the user resolves the ambiguity associated with the sinusoid's periodicity. Ensuring the validity of ambiguity resolution is the central challenge for the high-integrity, safety-critical JPALS application. Based on a multi-year, multi-institution collaborative study, this paper proposes a navigation and monitoring architecture designed to meet the guidance quality challenge posed by Sea-Based JPALS. In particular, we propose a two-stage navigation algorithm that meets the aggressive integrity-risk requirement for Sea-Based JPALS by first filtering a combination of GPS observables and subsequently exploiting those observables to resolve the carrier ambiguity. Because JPALS-equipped aircraft may encounter jamming, we also discuss interference mitigation technologies, such as inertial fusion and array antennas, which, with appropriate algorithmic modifications, can ensure integrity under Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) conditions. Lastly, we recommend a fault monitoring strategy tailored to the two-stage navigation algorithm. Monitoring will detect and isolate rare anomalies such as ionosphere storms or satellite ephemeris errors which would otherwise corrupt ambiguity resolution and positioning in Sea-Based JPALS.

The Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) is being deployed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to augment the Global Positioning System (GPS). The WAAS will aid GPS with the following three services. First, it will broadcast spread-spectrum ranging signals from communication satellites. The airborne WAAS receiver will add these new ranging signals to the GPS constellation of measurements. By so doing, the augmented position fix will be less sensitive to the failure of individual system components, thus improving time availability and continuity of service. Second, the WAAS will use a nationwide ground network to monitor the health of all satellites over our airspace and flag situations which threaten flight safety. This data will be modulated on to the WAAS ranging signals and broadcast to the users, thereby guaranteeing the integrity of the airborne position fix. Third, the WAAS will use the ground network to develop corrections for the errors which currently limit the accuracy of unaugmented GPS. This data will also be included on the WAAS broadcast and will improve position accuracy from approximately 100 m to 8 m. When complete, the augmented system will provide an accurate position fix from satellites to an unlimited number of aircraft across the nation. It will be the primary navigation system for aircraft in oceanic routes, enroute over our domestic airspace, in crowded metropolitan airspaces, and on airport approach.